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This thesis explores the nature and dynamics of risks faced by political leaders 
and military commanders in the conduct of milit<lry operations. It deve lops a 
systematic approach to analyzing and an etfeetive strategy for minimizing exposure 
to risks in military operations. 
This thesis describes a military operation's aggregate risk as the sum of two 
components: the risk of military fa ilure and the risk of political failure . Each 
component is shown to be usefully represented as a cost-weighted probability and 
the significant variables affecting the costs of failure and the probability of failure 
arc examined. Bascd on this conceptual framework, a mathematical model is 
formulated that illustrates the fluctuations in an operation's political, military and 
aggregate risk as a function of the amount of control delegated by the political 
leader to the military conunander. Analysis of this model leads to a useful approach 
fo r enhancing the success of military operations: command and control 
arrangements that reflect the optimal delegation of control minimize the operation's 
aggregate risk and, therefore, increase the likelihood of operational success. The 
thesis concludes by testing this strategy of risk minimization in two historical case 
studies and in a hypothetical application to a commando-type special operation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
TIlls thesis explores the nature and dynamics of risks faced by political leaders and 
mi litary conunanders in the conduct of military operations. It develop~ a systematic 
approach to analyzing and an effective strategy for minimizing exposure to risk in military 
operations. 
The political and military risks associated with a military operation often serve as 
powerful catalysts that trigger a struggle between the political leader and the military 
commander for control over the operation. Political risks increase the desire for control by 
the politieallcader who wants to ensure the tactical objectives and means are consi;;tent with 
the existing political requircmenK Military risks, on the other hand, increase the desire for 
control by the military commander; he seeks maximum autonomy in order to effectively 
conduct the battle and respond to contingencies. The end result is the command and control 
dilemma: each leader is driven by his perception of risks to struggle for increased control 
over tht: opcrntion. 1be model developed in this thesis provides a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the risks fdccd by each leader and thcsc risks' relationship with one another. 
The thesis shows that an operation's overall risk, or aggregate risk, is the stun of two 
components: the risk of military failure and the risk of political failure. Ibc elements of 
thesc ri~ks, the "cost offailure" and the "probability of failure," are examined in detail and 
the significant factors that affcct each an: deduced. A mathematical model is thcn fonnulated 
that provides a mechanism for observing the variations in an operation's milit.1ry, political 
and aggregate risk as a function of the delegation of control. Analysis of this risk model 
yields an effn .. tive strategy for managing the command and control dilenuna. 
In every military operation, a command structure is instituted for the execution of the 
tactical plan and the control of military lUlits; the establishment of a command relationship 
hetween the political]eader and military commander implies the delegation of some dt:gree 
of autonomous decision-making authority. The risk model allows the politieallcader and 
military commander to shift their focus from minimizing comp()nenl risk through a struggle 
for control to minimizing aggregate risk through an optimization of control. Tne utilization 
of command and control arrangements tnat reflect the optimum level of delegation, as 
determined by the risk model, results in the minimum possible expmure to overall risk and 
improves the likelihood of a successful military operation. 
Applications to historical cases illustrate the risk model's explanatory power. The 
first case study demonstrates the usefulness of decentralized control when the political 
situation penuits a high level of delegation to the military commander. In Operation 
URGENT FURY, the military risks dominated the political risks; the decentralized approach 
to command and control that was exercised effectively reduced the aggregate risk and 
granted the military commander the flexibility required to handle the military risks. 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON, on tne other hand, illustrates the necessity for 
centralized control when the JXllitical risks dominate the military risks. This operation's risk 
of political failure coupled with the rdativdy low risk of military failure required the 
politicallcader retain a high level of control to minimize aggregate risk and provide the 
flexibility necessitated by the political enviromnent. 
The usefulness of the risk model is not limited to explaining risk. An application of 
the model to a hypothetical special operation demonstrates its role as a predictive tool. 
Analysis of the aggregate risk solution for a generic commando operation reveals that the 
optimal command and control arrangement involves procedures that delegate slightly less 
than half of the control from the political leader to the military commander. 
In addition to a strategy of risk minimization, analysis of the risk model also yields 
a set of general prt"t:epts for the management of risk in military operations. Obviously, the 
minimization of aggregate risk is the most effective means of enhancing mission success 
A useful secondary goal, however, is to "lower" the whole aggregate risk eurve. Any 
individual action that lowers either the component military or political risk eurve will result 
in a lower aggregate risk regardless of the level of delegation. As a result, the following 
precepts can be derived from the model developed in Ihis thesis· 
• Ensure the force is prepared for the operation's tactical environment. 
• Ensure the force is prepared for the operation's required military tasks. 
• Minimize the number of seq uenti all simultaneous ta.<;ks required by the operation. 
• Keep the uperation's desired end-state as simple as possible 
• Attempt to minimize variations in the operation's political environment. 
• Maximize the coupling between the operation's military objective ~U1d its political 
objective 
The greater the degree to which these precepts are accomplished Juring the planning, 
preparation and execution of mil itary operations, the lower the overall aggregate risk 




The purpose of this thesis is to explore the dynamics of risk in military operations. 
In the pages that follow, I hope to shed some light on following questions: What are the 
underlying sources orthe natural tension betwcen political leaders and military commanders 
in the execution of military operations? What measures can be taken to ensure that the 
objectives of and tactical means employed in any given operation are consistent with that 
mission's political and operational requirements? What is the optimum system of control to 
ensure successful political-military integration in the execution of military operations? 
B. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL DILEMMA 
As Clausewitz noted, "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other 
means" (Howard 1984, 225). The success of any military application of force, then, requires 
(I) that political objectives arc appropriately determined and attained, and (2) that military 
objectives art: appropriately determined and attained. Difficulties in controlling mili tary 
operations stem from the fact that separate organizations are normally responsible for 
determining and attaining these objectives. In the United States, for instance, the National 
Command Authority is responsible for strategic policy while military commanders are 
responsible for tactical planning and execution. Organization theory suggests that such 
functional specialization gives rise to an inherent command and control dilemma: each 
organization will seek maximum autonomy (i.e. control over the mili tary application of 
force) in order to minimize it:; uncertainty. Given that such control is zero-sum, an increase 
in one organization's control dictates a decrease in the others. Additionally, the greater the 
uncertainty faced, the stronger the desire for autonomous control. 
C. RISK AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL DILEMMA 
1 believe that the key to understanding the command find control dilemma can be 
towld in the concept of risk in military operations. Analytic insight into the dynamics of risk 
in military operations provides not only a useful tool for understanding the nature of the 
eonunand and control dilemma but also a means for managing its effects. 
More so than uncertainty, the political and military risks associated with a military 
operation serve as powerful cat.liysts for the struggle over control. The execution of a 
special operation serves as a useful example. The very nature of special operations suggests 
that the conmland and control dilemma will be gn::atly amplified during the planning and 
execution of such military evolutions. The high political risks normally associated with 
special operations increase the des in:: for control by the political leader; he wants to ensure 
the tactical ohjectives and means arc consistent with the existing political requiremt:nts. The 
high military risks, on the other hand, increase the desire for control by the military leader: 
he desires maximwn autonomy in order to efft:etively conduct tht: operation and respond to 
cuntingencit:s. Thus, each leader is driven by his perception of risks to struggle for increased 
control over the operation. The model developed in this thesis provides a conceptual 
framework for analyzing the risks faced each leader and their relationship to each other; such 
an understanding of the nature and dynamics of risk in military operations is essential to 
managing the command and cuntrol dilenuna. 
In t:very military operation, a command structure is instituted for the execution of 
the plan and the control of the military Wlits; the establishment of a command relationship 
betwet:n the political leader and military commander implies the delegation of some degree 
of autonomous decision-making authority. In general, the risks faced by the political leader 
and military commandt:r arc inversely related to their respective levels of control. The 
challenge is to minimize an operation's aggregate risk (political risk and military risk) by 
optimizing command and cuntrol. The risk model developed in this thesis allows one to do 
just that. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II, this thesis develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the risk 
dynamics faced by political and military leaders in the conduct ofmilit.'U)' operations. Tn the 
next two chaptt:rs, the causal relationships between the delegation of control and tht: 
fluctuations in an operation's political, military and aggn:gate risk are identified and 
analyzed, and a mathematical model fonnulated . Two case smdies are then uscd in Chapter 
V to test the explanatory power of the modd: Operation URGENT FURY and Operation EL 
DORADO CANYON. In Chapter VI, the usefulness of the model as a predictive tool is 
demonstrated wi th a look at its application to special operations. The thesis concludes with 
a revicw of the strenb>1hs and weaknesses of the model and recommendations for additional 
rcsearch. 
E. A NOTE TO THE READER 
This thesis is neither research oriented, nor a scholastic attempt to "provc" a 
hypothesis. Rathcr, it is a thesis about ideas, concepts and gencralized relationships. Its 
primary aim is to develop a method for thinking about risk in military operations. Thc goal 
is to idcntify important independent variables, deduce their causal relationships and develop 
a framework for analyzing risk. 
In my review of thc literature on command and control and decision theory in 
\varfare, I found a vaCUlUll on the topic of risk. This thesis is my modest attempt to fill this 
void. J do not pretend to have found "the answer," but rather, offer this thesis as an initial 
attempt tomtrd increased understanding. 1fthi5 thesis stimulates additional thinking about 
the concept of risk in military operations and its relationship with command and control, then 
J shall think my efforts worthwhile. 

II. CONCEPTUALIZING RISK: AN ANAL ¥TIC FRAJ\1EWORK 
' nIC purpose of this chapter is to introduce ~Ul analyt ic framework for conceptualizing 
risk in military opcrations. In thc fornlUlation of any model, a balance must be struck 
between specificity and generality, between complexity and simplicity. An empbasis on 
modeling as accmately as possible leads to frameworks in which "the resulting modeled 
world appears as complex (and thus mystifying) as the concrete world it models." 
Excessively simple models, on the other hand, arc likely to overlook important variables and 
signifICant causal rclationships; such oversights can lead to a misunderstanding of the 
modelcd phenomenon. A good model, thcrefore, carefully balances complexity and 
simplicity, and serves as "an abstract toul of understanding,'· not an attcmpt "to reconstruct 
cuncrete reality in all its nuances and complexities." (Eckstein 1980, 162) 
The framework developed in this chapter provides just such a "balanced" model. It 
identifies the primary components of risk in military operations, the key factors that 
influence these components, and the general ways in which all clements of the framework 
relate to one another. Becausc the execution of mililary operations on the modem battlefield 
is indeed a complicated undenaking and the risks faced by political leaders and military 
commanders arc difficult to assess, the approach taken in this chapter is somewhat abstract 
and relics on generalizations to simplify the complex namre of combat. Tt includes, however, 
a sufficient level of detail to pemut a methodical examination of risk in military operations 
An assessment of the limitations imposed by the framework's simplifications and their 
impli cations on the usefulness on the model will be made in the concluding section 
A. RISK IN MILITARY Ol'ERAnONS 
L Military Operations and Failure 
"War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." As Clausewitz 
noted over two cenmries ago, the essence of warfare is poli tical; operations in war arc simply 
a military tool to achieve a poli tical end. This view ofwarfarc is ccntral to the framework 
presented here. For the purposes of this thesis, a military oJkration is defined as the tactical 
application of force t:mployed by a state in the pursuit of specific military objcctives that 
contribute to the unaimnent of an overall political objective. A graphical representation of 
tllls definition is presentcd in Figure 1. A simplified concept of the "chain of command" is 
u~ed in this framework and con~ists of u political leader concerned with the succes~ of the 
overall military operation, a military commander concerned with thc attainment of thc 
military objective, and the mili tary units employed to execute thc application of forcc. 
Figure 1. Dmgram ofMlhtary OperatIOn 
The success of any military operation rcquires (1) that the military objective i ~ 
appropriately determined and attained, and (2) that the political objective is appropriately 
detemlined and attained. Each objcctivc is a ncccssary but not sufficient condition for 
success. There are, therefore, two ways in which a military opt-Tation can fail: militarily and 
politically. A milit.'U)' failurt: occurs when the political objective ofa military operation i~ 
not attained due the failure oftht: application of force to achieve the military objective. A 
political f:"lilure occurs when the political objectivc of a military operation is not attained 
even though the application of force successfully achieve~ the military objective ·I11C 
distinction between these types of failure is graphically represented in Figure 2 
Figure 2. Types of Fal luTe 
2. Aggregate Risk in Military Operations 
fbe principal risk associated with a military operation can bc conceived of as the risk 
offailurc. Based on the preccding discussion, the aggrcgate risk of a military operation ean 
be viewed as having m'o components: the risk of military failure and the risk of political 
failurc. This relationship providcs the cornerstonc of the analytic framcwork and is 
illustrated in Figure 3 
3. Conceptualizing Risk in Military Operations 
Risk is normally regarded as the possibility of loss or the chance of incurring some 
type of liability. In othcr words, it is usually conceived of in probabilistic tenns. In order 
to analyze and compare separate components of risk, howcver, it is essential to look at not 
only the relative probabilities but also the relative costs. llJt~ risk of any cvcnt, thcrefore, can 
be more usdully thought ofas the product of (1) the probahility oflhat event oCl:Urring, and 
(2) the cost a~sociated with the event occurring. Conceiving of risk as a weighted prohabili ty 
allows for more meaningful comparisons between different types of risk. The remaining 
sections of this chapter apply this concept 10 the components of risk in military operations. 
Fi!o:ure 3. Components of Aggregate Risk 
R. THE RISK OF MILITARY FAILURE 
1. Components 
The risk ofmiEtary failure is the product of the probahility of military failure and the 
cost of military failu re. The prohability of military failure is simply the likelihood that a 
military opt:ration's application of force will fail to achievt: the military objectivt:. The costs 
ufmilitary failure arc the political consequences incurred by a state as a result ofa failure to 
achieve the milita.ry objective. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship 
2. Factors Affecting the Cost of Military }'ailure 
The principal determinants of the cost of military failure are domestic and 
international politics. The influence of domestic politics is determined by the degree to 
which a state's domestic audience is sensitive to a military operation and has the means to 
respond to a military failure. Likewise, the degree to which international politics intluence 
the cost of military failure is detennined hy the international audiences' sensitivity to a state's 
military operation and their response capability. These variahles have a direct relationship 
with the cost of a military failure in that an inerca.~e in either the sensitivity 10 a military 
operation or the audiences' capability to respond increases the cos\. Figure 5 illustrates this 
relationship. 
Figure 4. The Risk of Military Failure 
~'-. l ':;' MiIiboIyFIIiIunI 
-
Figure S. The Cost oLvhhtal) Fmlure 
3. Factors Affecting tbe Probability of Military Failure 
TIle principal factors affecting the probability of military fai lure are (1 ) the challenge 
of the tactical environment, (2) the readiness of the force, (3) the complexity of the militaIJ' 
operation, ami (4) the delegation of control. (See Figure 6). 
a. The Challenge of the Tactical Environmellt 
The challenge of the tactical enviromnent reters to the degree to which factors 
outside the direct control of tile military force pose obstacles to the forcc in its attempt to 
attain the military objective. Such factors include geography, the encmy order of batik, 
environment.1.1 cunditions and the tactical dynamism (the rate of change of such tactical 
considerations). The challenge of the tactical environment has a dircct relationship with the 
probability ufmililary fai lure; all other factors held constant, an increase in the challenge of 
the tactical environment leads to an increase in the probabi lity of military failure. 
Figure 6. The Probahility of Military Failure 
h. The Readi"e.~.~ of the Force 
The readiness of the force refers to the degree to which the military units are 
prepared to execute the tasks required by the military operation. An assessment of readiness 
includes a look at the manning, equipment status and training status of the force relative to 
the operation at hand. The readiness of the force has an inverse relationship with the 
probabil ity of military failure; all other factors held constant, an increase in the readiness of 
the force leads to a decrease in the probability of military failure. 
c. The Complexity of the Military Operation 
The complexity of the military operation refers tu the number of military tasks 
that are required to be accomplished by separate units operating simultaneously, each task 
being necessary but not sufficient to aceomplish the military objective. The complexity of 
the military operation has a direct relationship with the probability of military failure; all 
10 
other factors held constant, an increase in thc complcxity of the military operation leads to 
an increase in the probability of military failurc. 
d. The Delegation oj Control 
The delegation of control reters to thl: degree to which the military 
eommanrler has autonomous control owr the application of force in a military operation. Thc 
ddegation of control has an invcrse relationship with the probability of military failure; all 
othcr factors hdrl constant, an increase in the delegation of control leads to a dccrease in the 
probability of military failure 
C. THE RISK OF POLITICAL FAILURE 
1. Components 
The risk of political failure is the product of the probability of political fai lure and 
the co~1 of political failurc. The probabili ty of political failure is simply the likelihood that 
a military operation's application of torce and attainment of the military objective will fail 
to achieve the political objcctive. The oosts ofpoliticaJ failure are the political consequences 
incuITl:d by a state as a result of a failure to achieve the political objective. Figure 7 
illustrates this relationship. 
:Figurc 7. The RIsk ofPollllcal Fa!lure 
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2. Factors Affecting tbe Cost ofroliticallailure 
As in the (;ase ofrnilitary failure, the principal determinants of the cost of political 
fa ilure arc domestic and international polit ics. The influence of domestic politics is 
determined by the degree to which a state's domestic audience is sensitive to a military 
operation and has the means to respond to a political failure. Likewise, the degree to which 
international politics influence the cost of political failure is determined by the international 
audiences' sensitivity to a state's mili tary operation and their response capability. These 
variables have a di rect relationship with the cost of a political fail ure in that an incrcase in 
either the sensitivity to a military operation or the audiences' capability to respond increases 
the cost. Figure 8 illustrates this relationship. 
Figure 8. The Cost ofPollilcal l"mlure 
3. Fa{'tors Affe{'ting the Probahility of Political Failure 
The principal factors affceting the probability of political failure arc (I) the 
delegation of control, (2) thc complexity of the political objective, (3) the pol itical 
dynamism, and (4) the linkage between the military objective and the political objective. 
(See Figure 9) 
a. The Delegation of Control 
As before, the delegation of control rders to the degree to which the military 
commander has autonOtnOlL" control over the application of force in a military operation. In 
12 
this case, however, the delegation of control has an direct relationship with the dependent 
variable; all other factors held constant, an increase in the delegation of control leads to an 
increase in the probability of political fai lure. 
h. The Cf)mplexity of the Political Ohjectjl'e~' 
The complexity of the political objective refcrs to the degrte to which the 
desired end-state dcpends on numerous n::sponses by scparate individuals or states, each 
response being necessary but not sufficient for the attainment of the political objcctive. The 
wmplexity of the political ohjective has an direct relationship with the prohability of 
political failure; all other factors held constant, an increase in the complexity of the political 
objective leads to an increase in the probability of political failure 
Figure 9. The Probahility of Po]itical Failure 
c. The Political DYllamism 
Thc political dynamism rcfers to the degree to which the political 
environment varies with time. A highly dynamic political environment requires constant 
assessment and possihle adjustment ofthc political objective ; a static environment, on the 
other hand, requircs little such anention. The political dynanlisrn has an dir!;.": ct relationship 
with the probability of political failure; all other factors held constant, an increase in the 
political dynamism leads to an increas!;.": in the probability of political failure 
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d. Linkage between Military and Political Objectives 
Linkage refers to the degree to which the military obj<:(;tive of an operation 
directly coincides "'ith the political objective. An example of high linkage is a show of force 
operation; the political objective, demon~trating one's military capability, directly 
corresponds to the application afforce and the military objective. An attempt to influence 
another state's internal affairs through the employment of coven military operations, on the 
other hand, is an example of low linkage, Linkage has an inverse relationship with the 
probability ofpolitiUlI failure; all other factors held constant, an inaease in hnkage leads to 
a decrease in thc probability of political failure. 
D. A FRAr.-rnWORK FOR ANALYZING RISK IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 
The preceding sections of this chapter have identified the components of risk in 
military operations and the key variables that influence them. In Figure 10, the "picccs" have 
been "put together" and the consolidated framework is illlL~trated. 
1. Usefulness ufthe Framework 
Th<: framework presented in Figure 10 permits the systematic analysis of risk in a 
military uperation. An operation's aggregate risk has two components, military risk and 
political risk, each of which is a cost-w<:ighted probability. Evaluation of the key variables 
allows for an <:stimatiun of each component's cost-weighted probability and the direct 
comparison of military risk and political risk in a military operation. The framework also 
enables une to assess the impact of changes in th<: situation on thc levels of risk. A decrease 
in the complexity of the operation, for instance, decreases the probability of military failure 
but has no impact on th<: probability of political failure. The risk of political failure, 
thercfore, remains constant, bnt the risk of military failure and the aggregate risk of the 
operation hath decrease. 
2. Delegation or Control as the Central Variable 
Further examination of the framework highlights a central role played by the 
delegation of control in determining the risk ofa military 0pl:ration. Once an operation is 
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planned and forces assigned, all the key variables can be viewed as "constants" except for 
the delegation of control. It alone remains as a variable under the influence of a political 
leader throughout a military operation. As such, it has the potential to hecom!;.': an important 
tool in managing the levds of risk. 
Additionally, the delegation of control is the only key variable thai simultaneously 
effects both components of risk. It does so, however, with opposite results. An increase in 
the delegation of control to the military commander decreast:s the probability and risk of 
military failure , but at the same time, increases the probability and risk ofpoliticaJ failure. 
But what is the net impact on the military operation's aggn::gate risk? Does it decrease, 
remain the same, or increase? The conceptual framework presented in this chapter cannot 
answer these questions. 
3. The Need for a Mathematical Model 
The preceding discussion highlights the need for a more precise lUlderstanding of risk 
in military operations. While the conceptual framework provides a good model for 
organizing and understanding the variables affecting risk, it docs little to illustrate the 
dynamics of their causal relationships in anything more than general tenns. A quantitative 
model, rather than a qualitative one, is required for this type of detai led analysis; such a 
model is the subject of Chapter III. 
15 
Figure 10. Framework for AnalY7.ing Risk in Military Operations 
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III. OPERATIONALJZING ruSK: A FORMAL MODEL 
The analytic framework developed in Chapter II offers a practical means for 
organizing and understanding the key variables influencing risk in military operations. As 
previously discussed, however, undeNtanding the relationships in only general terms limits 
the usefulness orlhe framework to providing only general observations and explanations. 
A more ddailed and precise understanding of the framework's causal relationships is 
required tor true explanatory and predictive power. 
The purpose of this chapter is to prescnt a mathematical model derived from the 
anal}1ic framework developed in Chapter II. While the usc of quantitative methods for 
political and behavioml analysis is often criticized, mathematical models do ofTer significant 
bendits. TIley provide a rigorous logic to the relationships runong variables and a systematic 
method of predicting their interactions. Additional ly, mathematical models and the gmphical 
representation of their dynamics often allow for insights to be made and conclusions drawn 
that are not intuitively apparent. I 
This chapter is an attempt to shed light on and increase the tmderstanding of risk 
dynamics in military operations through the use of mathematical modeling techniques. The 
validity of such techniques rests primarily on the assumptions made in wrrelating the 
mathematical model with the actual phenomenon; the more logical the asslllTIptions, the more 
trustworthy the resulting conclusions. Special attention, therefon:, has been placed on careful 
explanations and justifications for the assumptions used in this model. TIle reSUlting 
mathematical model provides very interesting insight into the dynamics of risk in military 
operations and, as shown in Chapter IV, leads to a useful approach for enhancing the 
'For an excellent critique ufthc usefulness and limitations of quantitative methods 
applied to political and behavioral issues, see Ralph E. Strauch, "A Critical Assessment 
of Quantitative Methodology as a Policy Analysis Tool," in .Ii,falhematics ojConjlict, ed. 
Martin Shubik, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1983),29-54. 
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likelihood of success: risk minimization through the optimization of command and control 
arrangements. 
A. DERIVATION OF THE RISK EQt'ATION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a military operation's aggregate risk of failure 
can he thought of as having two components: the risk of military failure and the risk of 
political fai lure. If R .. repn:·sents the aggregate risk ofa military operation, RifF the risk of 
military failure, and R." the risk of political failure, then the relationship between the 
aggregate risk and its components can be represented hy: 
(1) 
It is important to note that the risk of political failure is actually the risk of political fai lure 
given a military success, and that ifthe[e is a military failure, then there is nccessarily a 
political failure. (See the Appendix for a proof of the additive nature of risk in tllis situation) 
As in the analytic framework, this relationship provides the basic structure for the 
mathematical model. 
Consistent with the definitions presented in Chapter II, the risk of an event can be 
oonceptuaiizc<i as the product of the cost associated with the event and the probability of the 
event occurring. The risk of military failure, therefore, is the product of the cost of military 
failure and thl: probability of military failure. Tf e_ represents the I:osl of military failure, 
and P _ the probability of military failure, tht."1l the risk of military failure can be represented 
by · 
(2) 
Similarly, the risk of political failun:, R", ,can be expressed as: 
(3) 
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By making the appropriate substitutions, the original equation can now be expressed as the 
sum of two cost-weighted probabilities: 
(4) 
The relationships suggested by this equation are depicted in Figure 11 and are consistent with 
the analytic framework presented in Chapter II. The following sections develop a 
mathematical framework for operationalizing the military and political components of this 
equation. 
Figure II. Components of the Risk 
Equation 
B. THE MTLIT ARY COMPONENT 
1. G eneral Equation for Risk of Military Failure 
As prcviously discussed, the risk of military failure is the product of the cost of 
mil itary fai lure and the probability of mili tary fai lure: 
(5) 
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The cost of a military failure is a function of the domestic and inkmational politics: 
C"",' [(Domestic Polilics,lml Politics) (,) 
The probability of a military failure is a function ufthechallenge of the tactical environment, 
the readiness of the forcc, the complexity ufthe operation, and the delegation of control : 
P MF • [(Challenge, Readiness, Complexity, Comrul) (7) 
The general equation for the risk uf mi litary failure can he expressed, therefore, as the 
product of these two functions: 
R_ • [(Domestic Politics, Inri Polirics) [(Challenge, Readiness, Complexity, Control) (8) 
2. Risk of Military Failure as a .Function of the Delegation of Control 
TIle next step in tht: fonnulation of the mathematical modd involves modifying the 
generlll equation for the risk uf military failure into one expressed as a function of the 
delegation of control. The delegation of control is sclected as the independent variable for 
two reasons. As discussed in Chaptcr n, the delcgation of control is the only key variable 
that simultaneously effects both compont:nts of risk. Additionally, once an operation is 
planned and forces assigned, all the key variables can be considered constants ex(;cpt for the 
delegation of control. It alonc remains as a variable under the influence of a political leader 
throughout the execution ofa mil itary operation. As such, it has the potential to become a 
mechanism for managing the levels of risks. 
In ordcr to modify the general equation into one expressed in tenns of the delegation 
of control, the model presented hen: assumcs a static perspective. At any particular point in 
time during a military operation, all the key variables (except the ddegation of (;ontrol) can 
be considered as established quantities and, therefore, as constants. The cost of military 
failure, a flmetion of domes tie and international politics, is independent ofthc delegation of 
control; its value will not vary with changes in the delegation of control and, therefore, can 
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be correctly expressed as the constant C""'. The probability of military failure becomes a 
function of the delegation of control, f(Conrrof). The other key variables affecting the 
probability of military failure (i.e., the challenge uflhe tactical environment, the readiness 
oflhe force, and the wmplexity of the military operation) are considered constants whose 
values determine the nature of this fuu(;tionai relationship. In other words, they define the 
way in which the probability ofmililafy failure will vat)' \\-lth the delegatiun of control. The 
risk of military failure can nuw be expressed as the product of a cost constant and a 
probability function" 
(9) 
3. Prohability of Military Failure as a Function of Delegation oCControl 
As discussed, the probability of military failure can be viewed as a function of the 
delegation of wntroL In such an approach, the uther key variables previously identified as 
affecting the probability ofmiliti\ry failure (i.e., the (;hallenge of the tactical environment, 
the readiness of the force, and the complexity of the military operation) become constants 
whose values determine the nature of this functional relationship. ·me following sections 
establish the baseline nm(;tional relationship between the probahility ofmililliry failure and 
the delegation of control, and illustrate the effects of the Olher key variables on this 
relationship. 
fl. BlL~eljne Function 
It wa:; established in Chapter II that the delegation of control has an inverse 
relationship with the probability of military failure; the greater the delegation of control, the 
lower the probahility of military failure. In mathematical terms, such a relationship can be 
expressed most simply a:; a do ..... nward sloping, linear funclion . The probability of military 
fai lure as a function of the delegation ufcontrul, then, can be modelcd by thc equation: 
PMF . /(Confrof) . I . Dc (10) 
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where Dc is the delegation of control expressed as a rcal number, 0 < Dc < 1, and represents 
the proportion of autonomous control dclegateJ from the political leader to the military 
commander. This equation will bc used to represcnt the basdine functional relationship 
between the probability of military failure and the delegation of control, and is graphically 
illustratcd in Figure 12. 
b. Effect ofVariahLe "Challenge of the Tactical Environment" 
At any point in tim!;.": during the execution of a military operation, the 
challenge presented by the tactical cnvironment can be assessed as "high", "neutral" or 
"low". A tactical cnvironmcnt that present" a neutral challenge is defined as a situation that 
had heen envisioned and trained for by th!;.": military force and for which the force has the 
required capabilities to opemte effectively. A highly challenging tactical environment, on 
the other hand, presents a situation for which the military force is ill-prepared. While a force 
Baseline Functional Relationship 
Figure 12. Probability of Military Failure as a Function of 
Delegation of Control 
may plan for a highly challenging tactical environment, it lacks the capability to operate at 
peak effectiveness in such a siluation. A taclical environment for which the military force 
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is exceptionally well prepared and poses few ohstacles is considered to pn:sent a low level 
of chaJlenge. 
Based on these defmitions, one can conclude that a neutral level of challenge 
presented by the tactical environment would have no effect on a military operation's 
probability of military failure or the probability's baseline functional n::Jationship with the 
delegation of control. Because the military force is adequately prepared for the situation at 
hand, introducing a tactical environment with a neutral level of challenge places no new 
demands on the military commander. This is not the case, however, in a highly challenging 
environment. 
A highly challenging environment affects the probability of military failure in two 
ways. First, it makes it more difficult for the military commander to attain the military 
objective, regardkss of his kveJ of control. Thus, the probability of failure is increased at 
cach and every level ofdelcgation; such an increase is reflectt:d in an unifonn shift upward 
of the baseline curvc shown in Figure 12 
lhc st'Cond ef'rect is less intuitive: a highly challenging tactical environment changes 
thc way in which the probability will vary with marginal increases in the delcgation of 
control. The basel ine func tional relationship rdlel:ts a constant marginal ratl: of change; 
each unit increast: in the delegation of control results in a nnifonn decrease in the probability 
of military failure. In a highly challenging tactical situation, howcver, a 1mit increase in the 
delcgation of control at thc low end of the scalc is of less utility to the military commander 
than a similar increase at the high end of the scale. This increasing marginal utility of control 
is due to the amount of control required by a military commander to accomplish the sub-
tasks of an operation in a highly challenging environment. Each sub-task, evtll thc most 
basic, is more difficult to accomplish and requires more control exercised by the military 
commander to ensure its success. A llllit increase in the delegation of control at the low end 
of lhe scale, therefore, does assist the military commander in bis ability to ext:eute the 
operation but docs not significantly decrease the probability of military failure . Similar 
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increases further up the scale, on the other hand, have greater utility to the military 
commander because each marginal increase in control results in an increasing number of sub-
lasks that can be successfully accomplished. The result is that a unit increase in the 
delegation of control at the high end ofthe scale significantly decreases the probability of 
military failure. 
Incorporating a tactical environment with a high level of challenge into the model 
requires that the baseline function be moditied to represent the unifornl shift npward and the 
increasing marginal utility of control to the military commander. These modifications are 
reflected in the function, 
P"", ·/(Con/ro/) · 1 - (Dc)" ~, (11) 
which is graphically displayed in Figure 13. This equation captures both effects a highly 
challenging tactical cnvirorunent has on the baseline functional relationship. The first efiect, 
a shift upward, is reOected in the term ~" which represcnts a subjective assessmcnt of the 
degree to which the challenge presented by the tactical environment exceeds the baseline, 
or neutral, level of challenge? The curve sho'Ml in Figure 13 assumes a P, of 0.1. Raising 
the independent variablc Dc to a power reOects the second effect. It gives the equation an 
increasing negative slope that appropriately rcpresents the increasing marginal utility of 
control to a military commander in a highly challenging tactical environment. Note that in 
this example, for values of Dc < 0.3, the solution ofllie function is greater than I. Since a 
probability cannot be greater than 1 or less the 0, the model assigns a value of I to functional 
solutions greater than 1, and a value of 0 to functional solutions less than 0 
2The tenn ~ I is assessed in tcnns of probability; it reflects the change in the 
probability offailure due to the key variable's variance from the norm (or neutral level). 
In Figure 13, the effect of P, is dearly evident at Dc=l . In the baseline functional 
relationship, the probability of military failure at this level of delegation is o. In a highly 
challenging tactical environment, the probability shifts to 0.1. This increase is ~ ,. The 
subscript is needed because additional variables that shift the function will be discussed. 
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This ~ame line of reasoning can be used to infcr the cffect" of a tactical environment 
with a low level of challenge on the baseline functional relat ionship. Introducing a tactical 
environment with a low level of challenge abo has two effects . First, such an environment 
decreases the probability oftailure at every level of delegation; this results in a uniform shift 
downward of the baseline curve. Second, a low level of challenge creates a situation in 
which the military commander experiences decreasing marginal utility of control. In such 
an environment, the sub-ta~ks which comprise the military objective are more easily 
accomplished and require less control to ensure their success. A unit increase in control at 
the low end ufthe scale, therefore, brings about greater "dividends" than a corresponding 
increase at the high end of the scale. Decreases in the probability of military failure, 
therefore, should be greater at the low end of the delegation scale than at the high end. Such 
a relationship can be represented by the equation: 
PM> - j{Control) . I . ,fi5;; - II, (12) 
which is graphically illustrated in Figure 14. TIlis equation captures both etlects that a 
tactical environment with a low level of challenge has on the baseline functional relationship. 
The first effect, a uniform shifl dovvnward, is reflected in the ternl ~I' which represents a 
subjective assessment of the degree to which the challenge presented by the tactical 
envirorunent is less than the baseline, or neutral, level of challenge. The curve shown in 
Figure 14 assumes a ~I of 0.1. Taking the square root of the independent variable Dc reflects 
the second effect. It gives the equation an decreasing negative slope that appropriately 
represents the decreasing marginal utility of control to a military commander in a tactical 
envirorunent with a low level of challenge. 
25 
Highly Challenging Tactical Environment 
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Figure 13. Probability of Military Failure as a Function of 
Delegation of Control in a Highly Challenging Tactical 
Environment 
I Tactical Environment with Low Challenge 
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Figure 14. Probability of Military Failure as a Function of 
Delegation of Control in a Tactical Environment with a 
Low Level of Challenge 
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c. Effect of Variuble "Readiness of the Force" 
Like the variable "Challenge ofthe Tactical Envirorunent," the readiness of 
the force employed ill an operation can be assessed as high, neutral or low. A neutral level 
of readiness is used here to denote military units that arc adequately prepared fo r the 
operational tasks and sub-ta~ks required by the military operation.] It fo llows that a high 
level of readiness denotes a force that is exceptionally well-prepared for the operation at 
hand, while a low level of readiness indicates military units that are poorly rehearsed in the 
required operational skills. 
As before, introducing a neutral level of readiness has no effect on an operation's 
probability of military fai lure or the probability 's baseline fu nctional relationship with the 
delegation of control. A high level of readiness, however, decreases the overall probability 
of mili tary fai lure and alters the linear baseline functional relationship to one that reflects 
decreasing marginal changes. Exceptionally well-trained troops are able to acoomplish the 
same operational tasks and sub-tasks with less control and direction than average troops. As 
a result, a military conunander derives more benefit from a unit increase in oontrol at the low 
end of the scale than he docs from the high end. These effects can be modeled by the 
equation· 
PMI' __ j(Cr>nlrof) - 1 -.;0;, - P, (13) 
I-Iert~, PI is used to represent a subjective assessment of the degree to which the readiness of 
the troops exeeeds the baseline, or neutral, level of readiness. As before, subtracting the tern] 
PI shifts the baseline enrve downward while taking the square root of the independent 
lit is usefUl to underscore the distinction lJetween the measure used here and the 
meaSl!l"e used for the "chal lenge of the tactical environment." The "readiness of the 
torce" is measured against the skills required by the operation itself, n:gardless of the 
environment it is being executed in. The "challenge oflhe tactical environment," on the 
other hand, is measured against the skills required to operate in the existing tactical 
environment, regardless of the type operation being conducted. 
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variable modifies the curvc to reflect the decreasing marginal utility of control to the military 
commander. 
As would be expected, a low level of readiness has the opposite effects on the 
probability of military fai lure and its functional relationship with the delegation of control. 
In addition to mising the ovemn probability of failure, poorly prepared military units require 
thc military commander exercise more control than nonnal to accomplish operational tasks 
and sub-tasks. Increases in control at the low end of the scale, therefore, do not providc 
much utility to thc military conuuander. Similar incrca~cs at the high end of the control 
scale, however, increasingly provide the requisite level of control and, as a result, begin to 
significantly decrease the probability of military failure. If P2 is used to represent a 
subjective assessment of the degree to which the readiness of the troops is less than the 
baseline, ur neutral, level uf readiness, these effects can be modeled hy the equation: 
P<LJ--j(Control}-l-(Dc.)'· P, (14) 
tL Effect of Variable "Complexity of the Operation" 
Like the previous variables, the complexity of a mil itary operation can be 
assessed as high, neutral or low. Neutral complexity is used here to denote a military 
operation in which the numberoftasb and sub-tasks required to be perfonned arc within the 
capabili ties of the assigned furees. An excessive number of tasks is indicative of an 
operation with high cumplexity, while a small number of tasks, well within the operational 
capabilities of the assigned foree is representative of a luw level of complexity. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the complexity uf the operation has a direct relationship 
\\ith the prohability of mil itary fai lure. Assuming a ncutml level of complexity has no effect 
on the baseline functional relationship, a high level ofoomplexity would result not only in 
an ovcrall increase in the probability but also a shift from the ba~c\ine's linear relationship 
to one that displays increasing marginal changes. Like a hi ghly challcnging tactical 
environment, a highly complex operation necessitates an increased amount of control 
2R 
exercised by the military commander to result in improved operational efficiency. A unit 
increase at the low end of the scale does have much utility to a military conunander in a 
highly complex operation; the probah.ilily of military failure, therefore, is not significantly 
affected at the low end of the scale. The same unit increase at the high end of the scale, 
however, increasingly provides the military conummder with the level of control required 
for success in complex operations. As before, if p, is used to represent a subjective 
.tSsessment of the degree to which the complexity of the operation exceeds the baseline, or 
neutral, level of complexity, then both of the effects of a complex operation can be 
mathematically represented by the equation: 
P MF • f(COlllrol) • I - (DcY • p, (15) 
Inverse relationships hold true for military operations with low levels of complexity. 
The overall probability of military failure dtereascs and the functional relationship shifts to 
reflect the decreasing marginal utility of control to a military commander in such a situation. 
rhese effects can be expressed by the equation: 
PMF ·/tCOnlf"Ol).1 -.fi5;:- p, (16) 
where p, is a subjective assessment of the degree to which the complexity of the operation 
is less th:m the baseline, or neutral, level of complexity. 
e. Net Effect of Variables on Baseline Equation 
The preceding sections have discussl.-d the individual efti..-cts of each variable 
on the functional relationship betwecn the probability of military failure and the delegation 
of control. The following paragraphs will address how the model incorporates the 
cumulative effect of these variables. 
In an errort to keep the model as simple as possible, no attempt has been made to 
prioritize the relative significance of the variables. In other words, the model asswnes each 
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variable's relative influenc~ on the baseline functional relationship is the same as the others. 
This approach allows for the direct comparison of each variable's effect~. 
An analysis of th~ functions used to represent the various effects of the variables on 
the baseline relationship between the probability of military failure and tht: delegation of 
control reveals that they can be expressed in the following generalized form: 
P MJ' • j(Control) • 1 (Dc)', P (17) 
where a represents the net eth:ct on the marginal ratc of chang~ (increasing or decreasing) 
and p represents the net effect of uniform shifts (upward or downward). [n the following 
paragraphs, an application of this portion of the model is used to demonstrate how a and p 
are assessed and calculated. 
The first stt:p in using the generalized function is to evaluate the key variables 
affecting the probability of military failure (the challenge of the tactical environment, the 
readiness of the force , and the complexity of the opcration). Each variable is assessed at 
either a high, neutral or low level and it~ effect on the marginal rate of change (i.e., whether 
it tends to increase or decrease the marginal rate of change) is noted. In addition, variables 
assessed as high or low are assigned a p which represents an assessment (in terms of its 
effect on the probability of military failure) of the degre~ to which that variable differs from 
its baseline. or neulml, value. These ~s are assignt:d a positive value for variahles whose 
level increases the probability of military failure, a negative value for variables whose level 
decreases the probability of military failure , and a value of () for variables assessed at a 
neutral level. 
The term a in the generalized equation is determined by the formula : 
a .~ 
I.D 
where [= [the number of variables that increllSt: the marginal rate of change], and 
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(1') 
D = [the nwnber of variables that decrease the marginal rate of change].' The term p in the 
gem:raliJ:ed equation is detemlined by the formula 
(19) 
Whcre Ii I is the beta as~igned to each kcy variable. Thc following exrunple illustrates the 
mechanics of calculating thesc tcmlS. 
In this exrunple, the challenge presented by thc tactical environment and the 
complexity ofthc operation are both assessed as neutral, but the readiness of the troops is 
assessed as high, with a p= -0.1 (a high le .... el of readiness decreases the fisk of military 
failure , thefeforc p is gi .... en a ncgativc value). Only the variable readiness has an effect on 
thc marginal rate of change (decreasing); the variables assessed l!t neutral levels have no 
effect on the marginal rate of change. TIle calculation of« yields: 
(20) 
The calculation of p yields 
Ii · t Ii, - [(0.0), (0.0). (-0.1)1 - -0.1 (21) 
4Therc is no rigorous mathematical basis for this formulation of «; rather, the 
formula used here is the simplest expression that captures the theoretical shifts envisioned 
in the risk curves. 
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Thus, the fundion that ~st models the probability of military fai lure as a functiun of the 




By assessing the level of eaeh variahle for a given military opemtion, noting its 
influence on the marginal mte of change, and evaluating thc terms a and p, one can use the 
generalized equation to determine the nmctlon that best models the probability of military 
failure as a function of the delegation ofeontrol for a given operation. Since there arc three 
variables and three levels of assessment for each variable, 27 pennutations are possible 
within this eump:ment of the model. A summary of each possihle combination of variables 
and the resulting as and ps is shown in Table 1. Variables assessed as high or low are 

















High High High 
High 
High 
High High 03 
Table I. Pennutat.lOnS of the Variables Effecting the Probablhty ofMlhtary Failure and the 
Resulting Values of a and ~ 
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C. THE POLITICAL COMPONENT 
1. General Equation for Risk ofl'olitieal Failure 
The risk of political failure is the product of the cost of political fail ure and the 
probability of political failure: 
(25) 
Thc (;Ost ofa political failure is a function of the domestic and international polit ics: 
Cn • / (Domestic Politics, Inti Politics) (26) 
Thc probabiLity of a political fai lure is a function of the delegation of control, the complexity 
of the political objcctive, the dynamism of the political environment, and thc operation's 
political linkage: 
PH • / (Conlrol, Complexity, Dynamism, LinhIge) (27) 
The general equation for thc risk of political failure, therefore, can be expressed as a product 
of these two fUnctions: 
Rn ' /(Domestic Politics, Int! Politics)/(Contro{, Complexity, Dynamism, Linlwge) (28) 
2, Risk of Political Failure as a Function of the Delegation of Control 
As in the ca~e ufmilitary failure, the next step in developing the mathematical model 
involves modifying the general equation for thc risk of political failure into one that is a 
function of the delegation of control. By again taking a static approach, all the key variables 
(except the delegation of control) in the model can be considered as established quantities 
and, therefore, as constants, 
TIle cost of political failurc, a fUnction of domestic and international politics, is 
independent of the delegation of control; its value will not vary with changes in the 
delegation of control and, therefore, can be correctly expressed as the constant C I'F' The 
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probability of political failure is expressed simply as a nmction orlhl;.': delegation of control, 
f(Control). The other variables affecting the probability of political fai lure (i_c., the 
complexity ofthe political objective, the political dynami~m, and the linkage) are considered 
constants whose values detennine the nature ofthis functional relationship. Tn other words, 
they define the way in which the probability of political failure will vary v.ith the delegation 
of control. The risk of political failure can now be expn:ssed as a function of the delegation 
of control: 
(29) 
3. Probability oCPolitical Failure as a Function of Delegation of Control 
u. Baseline Function 
As discussed in Chapter II , the probability ofpoliticaJ failure has ~m direct 
relationship with the delegation of control; in general, the greater the ddl:gation of control, 
the greater the probability of political fai lure. The more control a politicalleadcr delegates 
to a military commander, the greater the chance of a disconnect between the military mcans 
used to attain the military objective and the overall political objective. In mathcmatical 
tcnm, such a relationship can be cxpressl:d most simply as a upward sloping, lincar function. 
The probability of political failure as a function of the delegation of oontrol, then, can be 
modeled by thc cquation: 
(30) 
This equation will be used to represent the baseline functional relationship betwecn the 
probabili ty of political failure and the delegation of control, and is graphically illustrated in 
figure 15 . 
Following the methodology used in the prl:u-:ding sections on the military component 
of the risk equation, the next paragraphs address the influence ofthc key variables affecting 
the political component of the model. The distim:tions hetv.'een high, neutral and low levels 
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of each key variable will he discussed and their effects on the baseline functional relationship 
will be examincd. A swrunary of all thc possible combinations of these variables will then 
be presented along with a discussion of hm". the model incorporates their net effect on the 
basel inc relationship. 
Baseline Functional Relationship 
Figure 15. Probabili ty of Polit ical Failure as a Function of 
Delegation of Control 
b. 1!.1fect ojVariabJe "Complexity ojthe Political Objective" 
As defined in Chaptcr II, the complexity ofthc political objectivc refcrs to thc 
dcgrec to whieh the desired end-state depends on inducing appropriate responses from a 
nunlher of separate individuals or states, each response being necessary but not sufiicient for 
the attainment of the political objective. A neutral level of complexity exists in the political 
objective when the nunlber and type of actors a political leader must dcal with are within the 
capability of his diplomatic apparatus. A high level of complexity, then, is indicative of a 
situation in which thc nwnber or type of external actors create problems in diplomatic 
commlll"lications and coordination. A state dealing with underground, sub-state actors, for 
instancc, has great d ifticulty in establishing an effective means of communications for 
negotiations or diplomatic signalling. A low level of complexity, on the other hand, exists 
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when a state has very effective means of conmlUnicating and coordinating with the rcquired 
extemal actors. 
A high level of complexity in thc political objective has two effect<; on the prohability 
of political failure. First, the increased cumplexity makes the political objective more 
difficult to attain, regardless of the level of control retained by the political leader. This 
resul t<; in a unifonn shift upward in the haseline fum;tional relationship. Second, a high level 
of complexity ehangcs the ,vay in which the probability of political fai lure will vary with the 
delegation of control. It dictates that the political leader must retain a high degree of control 
in order to prevent a decoupling ofthc military and (XIlitical objectives. The probability of 
political failure, then, has a tendency to rise quickly as the poli tical leader begins to delegatc 
control to the mil iary commander. Further increases in the delegation of cuntrol, however. 
result in smaller marginal ch:mges. Since the effective range of control required by the 
political commander has already been passed, the additiunal delegation of control has 
decn:asing influence on the probability offailufC. A high level of complexity in the political 
objective, therefore, has the effect of modifying the linear baseline relationship to one that 
exhibits decreasing marginal changes. These effects can be mathematically modeled with 
the function: 
(31) 
which is graphicalJy shown in Figure 16. This equation captures both dTects a highly 
complex political objective has on the basdine functional rdationship. The first effect, a 
shift upward. is reflectcd in the tcml YI, which represents a subjective assessment of the 
degree to which lhe political objective's complexity exceeds the baseline, or neutral, level 
of complexity. The curve shown in Figure 16 assumes a YI of 0.1. Taking the square root 
of the independent variable Dr reflects the second effect. It gives the curve a decreasing 
positive slope that appropriatdy represents the dl-creasing marginal changes in the 
probability of failure as control is delegated from a political leader W a mililary commander. 
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Note that in this example, for values of Dc> 0.8, the solution of the function is greater than 
I. Since a probabil ity cannot be greater than 1 or less the 0, the model assigns a value of I 
to functional solutions greater than 1, and a value of 0 to functional solutions less than O. 
A low level of complexity in the political objective has the opposite effects. First. 
a simple political objective is easier to attain regardless of the political leader's level of 
control. This results in a uniform shift downward in the ba~eline rellltionship. Additionally, 
if the political objective is not complex, the political leader v.-ill be well positioned to 
communicate and coordinate with required actors; he can, therefore afford to deleglltc more 
control to the military commander v.-ithout significantly raising the probability ofa political 
failure. Further delcgation of control, however, results in increasingly largcr incremental 
rises in the probability of failure. These two effects, the increasing marginal changes and the 
uniform ship downward, can be modeled by the equation: 
(32) 
which is also shown in Figurc 16. The first cffect, a shift dO\\11ward, is reflected by 
subtracting the teml Y I, which represents a subjective assessmcnt of the degree to which thc 
political objective's complexity is less than the baseline, or neutral, level of complexity. The 
curve shown in Figure 16 assumes a YI of 0.1. Squaring the independent variable Dc reflects 
the second effect. It gives the equation an increasing positivc slope that appropriately 
represent~ the increasing marginal changes in the probability of failure as control is delegated 
from a political leader to a military commander. 
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Figure 16. Effect ofVariablc "Complexity" on the 
Probability of Political Failure as a Function of Delegation 
of Control 
c. EjJect ofVariable "Political Dynamism" 
The political dynami~m ora mil itary operation refers to the degree to which 
the existing political environment varies with time. A high level of political dynamism 
exists in a military operation when the potential pace of diplomatic efforts and l'hangcs in 
the political environment ~trains the capability of the polilicalleader to effectively C{)ordinate 
with his military C{)mmander. Such an environment makes it more diffic ult for the political 
leader to attain the political objective, regardless oflhe level of control he retains. As hefore, 
this results in a unifonn shift upward in the baseline relationship between probability of 
fai lure and delegation of l'ontrol. Additionally, because a highJy dynamic political 
environment requires C{)nstant assessment and possible adj ustment of the political objective, 
the political lcader must retain a high degree of control in order to prevent a disconoect and 
political failure. As in the previo\lS case, the probability of political failure has a tendency 
to rise quickly as the political leader begins to delegate control to the miliary commander 
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Further increases in the delegation of control, however, result in smaller marginal changes. 
Since the effective range of control required by the political commander has already been 
passed, thc additional delegation of control has decreasing influence on the probability of 
failure. i\. high level ufpo litieal dynamism, therefore, has two effects on the linear baseline 
relationship These effects can be mathematically modeled with the function: 
P~F . j(Controf) • ..[i5;:' 'I l (33) 
The first effect, a shift upward, is reflected in the tenn '12> which represents a subjcctivc 
asscssmcnt of the degnx to which the envirunment's political dynamism exceeds the 
baseline, or m:utraJ, level of dynamism. Taking the square root ufthe independent variable Dc 
reflects the second effect. It gives the curve a dct:reasing positive slope that appropriately 
represents the decreasing marginal changes in the probabi lity of faiiLrre as cuntrol is 
delegated from a political leader to a military commander. 
A low level of dynamism has the opposite effects. The probability of a discOlllleet 
is lower in a stable political environment because the political obj ective does not require 
constant monitoring and reassessment. Since the political leader can effectively respond to 
changes in snch a political environment, he can afford to delegate more eontrul to the 
military commander without significantly raising the probability of a political failure. 
Further delegation of control, however, results in increasingly larger incremental rises in the 
probability of failme. As in the previous case, these two effects un the baseline relatiunship 
can be modeled by the equation: 
(34) 
'Ibe first effect, a shift downward, is reOectcd by subtracting the term '12> which represents 
a subjective a<;sessment of the degree to which the environment's political dynamism is less 
than the baseline, or neutral, level uf dynamism. Squaring the independent variable D c 
reflects the second effect. It gives the equation an increasing positive slope that 
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appropriately represents the increasing marginal changes in the probability of failure as 
control is delegated from a political leader to a military commander 
d. Effect of Variahle "Linkage" 
Linkage refers to the degree to which the military objcetive of an operation 
coincides with the political objective. As discussed in Chapter II. a high kvel of linkage 
exists when thc military and political objective aTe basically one in the same. As opposed 
to the other t\vo variables just discussed. linkage has an inverse relationship with the 
probability of political failure. A high level of linkage, therefore, lowers the overall 
probability of political failure and llllows the politieal lcader to delegate more l:ontrol to the 
military commander before the probability is significantly affected. As before. these two 
cffel:ts l:an be mathematically expressed by the equation: 
PeF _j(Control) - (D,Y - Y, (35) 
The first effect, a shift dO\\11ward, is reflected by subtracting the term Y), which represeniS 
a subjective asseSSlllt:nt of the degree to which the operation's politil:allinkage is less than 
the baseline, or neutral, level of linkage. Squaring the independent variable Dc reflects the 
second effect. It gives the equation an increasing positive slope that appropriately represents 
the inneasing marginal changcs in the probllbility offailure as control is delcgated from a 
political leader to a military commander. 
A low level of linkage has the opposite effect. The indirect nature of the l:oupling 
between the military and political objective raises the overall probability of political failure 
and requires thc political leader cxercise tight control over the operation to prevcnt political 
failure. As soon as the politiclli kader begins to delcgate control to the political commander, 
the probllbility ofpoliticaJ failure rises significantly. Furthcr delegation of control continues 
to increase the probability of political failure, but in decreasing incremental changes. Thcse 
effects can be mathematically modeled with thl: 1:4uatio1l' 
P~F -j(C()nlrof) '.f15;,. Y, (36) 
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The tirst effect, a shift upward, is reflected in the term y" which represents a sUbjective 
assessment of the degree to which the operation's political linkage exceeds the baseline, or 
neutral, level of linkage . Taking the square root of the independent variable Dr reflects the 
second effect. It gives the curve a decreasing positive slope that appropriately represents the 
decreasing marginal changes in the probability of failure as control is delegated from a 
politicalleadcr to a military commander. 
e. Net Effect o/Variahles on Baseline Function 
The cumulative effect of these key variables on the baseline functional 
relationship between the probability of political failure and the delegation of control is 
handled in exactly the same manner as before. Again, no attempt has been made to prioritize 
the relative signiticance of the variables. 
An analysis of the functions used to represent the various effects of the variables on 
the baseline relationship between the probability of political fa ilure and the delegation of 
control reveals that they can he expressed in the following generali:a:d form 
(37) 
when: a represents the net effect on the marginal rate of change (increasing or decreasing) 
and y rcpresents thc net effect of unifornl shifts (upward or downward). In the following 
paragraphs, an application of this portion of the model is IIsed to dcmonstrate how 0 and y 
are assessed and calculated. 
The first step in using the generalized function is to evalnate the key variables 
aJ1ecting the probability of political failure (the complexity of the political objective, the 
political dynamism, and the linkage). Each variable is assessed at either a high, neutral or 
low level and its effect on the marginal rate of changc (i.e., whether it tends to increasc or 
deerease the marginal rate of change) is noted. In addition, variables a'lscssed as high or low 
are assigncd a y which represents an assessmcnt of the degree to which that variable differs 
from its baseline, or ncutral, value. These ys are a'lsigned a positive value for variables 
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whose level increases the probability of political failure, a neglltivc value for variables whose 
level decreases the probability of political failure, and a value of 0 for variables llssessed al 
a neutral level 
The lenn 0 in the generalized cqulliion is determined by the fornlUla: 
o.~ 
1. D 
where J = [the number of variables that increa~e the marginal rate of ehangeJ, and 
(38) 
D = [the number of variables that decrease the marginal rail;.': of chllnge] the tern] y in the 
generalized equation is determined by the fomlUla: 
(39) 
Where Yi is the garruna assigned to each key variable. The following example illustrates the 
mechanics of calculating these tenns. 
In this example, the complexity of the political objective and the political dynamism 
are assessed as low, each a with y = -0.1 (a low level of complexity and a low level of 
dynamism each lowers the probability of political failure, therefore y is given a negative 
value). The linkage is a<;sessed as neutral. TIle low levels ofthe complexity and dynamism 
both have an effect on the marginal rate of change (increa~ing); because the linkage is 
assessed at a neulrallcvel, it has no effeet on the marginal rate of change. The calculation 
of 0 yields' 
o. ¥n ¥o,3fl . 3 (40) 
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The calculation of y yields: 
Y • t, Y,' [(-0.1), (-O.l ) • (0.0)] · -0.2 (41) 
Thus, the function that best models the probability of political failure as a function of the 
delegation of control for this example operation is: 
(42) 
(43) 
By assessing the level of each variable for a given military operation, noting its 
in1luence on the marginal rate of change, and evaluating the tenns (I and Y, one can usc the 
generalized equation to detennine the function that best models the probability of political 
fai lure as a function of the delegation of control for a given operation 
As before, there are three variables and three Icvels of assessment for each variable; 
27 additional pennutations are possible within this component of the model. A summary of 
each possible combination of variables and the resulting (IS and ys is shown in Table 2. 
Variables assessed as high or low are assumed to have a y= 0.1 (+1-, as appropriate). 
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Table 2. Permutations of Variables Effecting the Probability of Political Failure and the 
Resulting Values of 0 and y 
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D. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The preceding sections have developed the mathematical framework for describing 
the individual military and political components of risk in a military operation. In this 
section, these components arc consolidated into a singlc model for descrihing an operation'S 
aggregate risk. After explaining the methodology used for assessing and comparing the 
military and political costs of failure, a comprehcnsive example is used to illustrllte the 
appli(;lItion of the entire model 10 a military operation. 
I. The Costs of Failure 
As previously discussed, the costs of milit.ary and political failure are considered 
constants and servc to wcight the appropriate probabilities of failure. Hut how can one 
quantify such costs? What scale can be used to for their comparison? The risk model 
presented hcre avoids these difficult questions by measuring the costs relative to each other. 
In most situations, the cost of a military failure is indistinguishable from the cost of a 
political fa ilure; in such a case, the model assigns a value of 1 to each cost: 
(44) 
In some cases, however, one cost mlly bcjudged as greater than the other. Here a subjective 
assessment of the relativ<:: difference between the two oost<; is made. For instance, if the cost 
of political failure is subjectively assessed as twice as great as the oost of military failure, the 
model would assign the following values: 
(45) 
Such an approach allows the direct comparison of the costs in a military operation without 
objective standards of measurement. 
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2. The Consolidated Model 
A brief summary of the mathematical framework developed in this chapter is 
necessary at this point to pull together the highlights ofthe preceding discussions and present 
the consolidated model 
A military operation's aggn:gatc risk of failure can be thought of as having two 
components: the risk of military failure and the fisk of political failure: 
(46) 
The risk of an event can be conceptualized as the product of the cost associated with the 
event and the probability of the event occurring. The risk of mil itary fa ilure, therefore, is the 
product of the cost of military failure and the probability of military failure. 
(47) 
Similarly, the risk ofpolilicai failure, R~F' can be expressed as: 
(48) 
Uy making the appropriate substitutions, the original equation can now be expressed as the 
sum of two cost-weighted prohabilities· 
(49) 
In temlS of the independent variable, "the delegation of control," this equation can be written 
(50) 
In modifying this equation to reflect risk as a fum;tion of the delegation of control, the (;osts 
of military and political failure remain constants and are measured relative to each other. 
'lbe probahility of military failulX becomes a function of the delegation of control; the nature 
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of this function is detennined by an evaluation oflhe key v~ri~bles affecting Ihe prob~bility 
ofmilit~ry failure (the ch~l1enge of the tactical environment, the re~diness of the force, and 
the complexity of the operation) and assessing their net effect on the b~scline functional 
relationship (as summarized in T~ble I). 
Similarly, the probability ofpoliticai failure also becomes a function of the delegation 
of control. The nature of this ftmction is detennined by an ev~luation of the kl;.":y variables 
affccting the probability of political f~ilurl;.": (the complexity of the political objective, the 
political dynamism, and thl;.": linkagc) and asscssing their ncl effcct on the basehnl;.": functional 
relationship (as summ~ri7.ed in Table 2). 
A hypothetical example and an ~pplicalion ofthe model illustrates these mechanics. 
In this example, the cost of military failure is assumed to be roughly equal to the cost ofa 
political failure. Therefore, CMF • C'F ' J. rhc challenge presented by the tactical 
environment and thc complexity of the operation are both ~ssessed as ncutr~l, but the 
readiness of the troops is assessed as high, and with a ~ =- -0.1 (a high level of n:adincss will 
shift the ba~eline curve downward, thcrefore ~ is given a negative value). Only the variable 
readiness has an effcet on the marginal rate of change (decreasing); the variables a<;sesscd 
~t neutral lcvels have no efied on thc marginal ralc of change. Table 1 indicates that the 
probability ofruilitar)' failure as a flUlction of the delegation of control is best expressed by 
the funct ion 




The complexity oflhe political objective and the political dynamism are assessed as low, 
each with a y ~ -0. 1 (a low icvd of complexity and a low icvd of dynllmism each shift:; the 
baselinc cllrve downward, thercfore y is given a negative v~luc). The linkage is assessed as 
neutrill. Thc low levels of the complexity and dynamism both have an effect on the 
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marginal rate of change (increasing); because the linkage is assessed at a ncutrallevd, it ha~ 
no effect on the marginal rate of change. Table 2 indicates that the probability of political 
failure as a function orthe ddegation of contrul is best expressed by the fimction: 
Having I:stablished the values and appropriate functions for e"", CF/' ' P Ml" PPF' 
substitutions arc made in the aggregate risk equation: 
R .. • [(I) (0.9 "y'D,)] , [(1 ) «Dc)' - 0.2)] 





The graphical representation ofthi~ aggregate risk equation and its compom:nts (risk 
of military failure and fisk of political tailurc) is depicted in Figure 17. Nole that the 
aggregate risk curvl: does not exactly correspond to Equation 59 for all values of Dc (i.e., 
when Dc= 0.1, Equation 59 generates an aggrcgall;.': risk value uf approximately 0.37 units 
vice the 0.55 lUlit~ sho",,} in the figure). This discrepancy is characteristic of the model and 
results from constraints on the prohability nmctions embedded in thc overall aggregate risk 
equation. Since probabilities cannot be less than 0 or greater than 1, the risk model truncates 
the P MF and P PF functiolls whcn the shift parameters, p and y, have thc effect of forcing thc 
nmctions outside the~e Iimit~. These truncations can result in an illconsistency bdween the 
purely mathematical fonnulation of the aggregate risk equation, which does not take account 
ofthc constraints on thc probabilities, and the risk model's graphical represcntation of the 
aggregate risk curve. 
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Aggregate Risk of Example Operation 
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Figure 17. Example Military Operation's Aggregate Risk 
The next chapter will explore the usc of the mathemalicaJ modd as a 1001 to assist 
in the planning of military operations. It will discuss the concept of risk management 
through the optimization of oontrol, the various clltegorics of aggregate risk solutions and 
the implications for command and control arrangements 
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TV. MANAGING RISK: THE MODEL AS A PLANNING TOOL 
fhe preceding chapters have systematically developed a cunceptual framework and 
forma l modd for analyzing fisk in military operations. The purpose uflhis chapter is to 
explore the theoretical application of til(: risk mudd as a planning tool. It begins by 
demonstrating how employment of the model allows a political !cader to analyze the risk 
dynamics inherent in a given military operation and minimize risk exposure through the 
optimization of control. The chapter then examines the general aggregate risk solutions 
generated by the model , the potential types of delegation enor and the resulting implications 
for command and control arrangements. 
A. THE MODEL AS A PREDICTIVE TOOL 
1. Key Assumption 
A necessary assumption for the use urlhe risk model as a predictive tool is that a 
primary goal in any military operation is the reduction of the overall risk of failure. In this 
view, the proper focus of the senior decision-maker is the minimization of exposure to 
aggregate risk, rather than the n:duction of either of its components (i.e., the risk of military 
failure or the fisk of political failure). Thus, while both the military commander and the 
political leader are considered to be risk-adverse and are expected to desire minimum levels 
of their respective risks, the political leader (the senior decision-maker) is asswncd to 
maintain a more strategic outlook toward the operation and, therefore, prefer the 
minimization of aggregate risk. 
2. Ri.~k Minimization through Optimization or Control 
The risk model can be thought of as a tool for predicting how risk in a military 
operation will vary with changes in the delegation of control. As such, it provides a means 
for analydng the risk dynamics of the operation and minimizing aggregate risk through the 
optimization of oontrol. 
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As explained in the previous chapter, the first step in applying the model is to assess 
the levels of the key variables affecting the probability of military failure and the probability 
of political failure. This assessment involves a determination of the variable's level (high, 
neutral or low) and assigning a ~ or y (which represents a subjective assessment of the 
degrec to which that variable differs from its baseline, or neutral value). The costs of 
military failure and political failure are then assessed relative to one another and values 
assigned that represent their ratio. Anned with this infonnation and the Tables listed in 
Chapter III , the equations that best represent the risk of military failure and the risk of 
political failure as functions ofthe delegation of control can be determined and graphically 
displayed. Examination of the resulting aggregate risk curve reveals the level(s) of control 
delegation at which aggregate risk is minimized. By planning and executing a military 
operation's command and control arrangements at the optimal level of delegation, the 
political leader can ensure minimum exposure to aggregate risk in the operation. 
B. RISK SOLUTIONS 
Applications of the risk model to military operations result in aggregate risk solutions 
that fall into one of three general categories: constant solutions, interior solutions and 
exterior solutions. 
1. Constant Solutions 
Constant solutions occur when the following two conditions are met: first, when the 
costs of military failure are equal to the costs of political failure; and second, when the 
political leader and the military commander experience the same rate of marginal change 
The aggregate risk in a constant solution remains at the same level, regardless of the level 
of delegation of control. Thus, there is no optimal level of delegation ill such an operation 
An example constant solution is shown in Figure 18. It is interesting \0 note that whik the 
aggregate risk does not vary with chrmgcs in the delegation of control, the component risks 
(risk of military failure and risk of political failure) vary considerably. 
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2. Interior Solutions 
Interior sol utions for aggregate risk occur when the political leader cxperiences 
incrcasing marginal changes in the risk of political failure and!or the military commander 
experiences decrea~ing marginal changes in the risk of military failure_ The aggregate risk 
in an interior solution has a minimum at some level of delegation, 0 < Dc < I. Optimi7.ation 
of command and control involves arrangeml;.':nts to ensure the delegation nf cuntrol 
approaches this value of Dc 
Constant Solution 
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Figure 18. Example Aggregate Risk Solution with Constant Level uf 
Risk 
An exanlple of a military operation with an interior solution is sho\\TI in figurc 19. 
Assl;.':s~ment of the key variables indicates thflt the po\itical leader experiences increasing 
marginal changes in the ri~k of political failure while the military conunander experiences 
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decreasing marginal changes in the risk of military failure . The minimum value for the 
operation's aggregate risk (0.14 units ofrisk) occurs at a delegation of c·ontrol cqual to 0.6. 
Optimization of command and control, therefore, involves arrangements to ensure the 




Figure 19. Example Aggregate Risk Solution with Interior Optimization 
Point 
3. Exterior Solutions 
Exterior solutions for aggregate risk OCCllI when the political kadcr expt..-riences 
decreasing marginal changes in the risk of political failure and/or the military command!>:r 
experiences increasing marginal changes in the risk of milit.1.fY failure . The aggregate risk 
in an exteriur solution has a minimum at Dc equal to either 0 or I; the aggregate risk is 
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greater for all other levels of delegation. Such a solution suggests that the optimization of 
command tlIld control occurs with either the political leader retaining all control (for 
operations with aggregate risk minimum at Dc= 0). or with him delegating all control to the 
military commander (for operations with aggn:gate risk minimum at Dc= 1). 
An example ofa military operation '<','ith an exterior solution is shown in Figure 20. 
Assessment ofthe key variahles indicates that the political leader experiences decreasing 
Exterior Solution 
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Fi~ure 20. Example Aggregate Risk Solution with Exterior Optimization 
Points 
marginal changes in the risk of political failure while the military conunander experiences 
constant marginal changes in the risk of military failure. The minimwn value for the 
operation's aggregate risk (1.0 units of risk) occurs at II ddegation of control of Dc equal to 
1.0. The Ievd of aggregate risk is higher for all other levels of delegation. Theoretically 
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then, the optimization of command and control involves arrangemcnts to ensure the political 
leader delegah:s complete control of the operation to the military commandcr 
C. ERROR TYPES 
The aggregate risk solutions generated hy the model indicate thcre arc different ways 
in which errors can be madc in the delegation of control. Tn general, then:: are three typcs of 
error that can occur with respect to the uptimizatiun of control. Type A crrurs occur when 
the political leader fails to delegatc sufficicnt control to the military commandcr. They 
generally result from instances in which the political leader neglects to concentrate on 
minimizing aggregate risk lmd focuses instead on reducing the component risk of political 
failure 
The less common Type B error, on the other hand, occurs when too much control is 
delegated to the military commander. If the political leader discounts the risk of political 
failure and attempts to assist the military commandt:t" in reducing the risk of military failure, 
then a suhoptimal delegatiun of excessive control will result. 
Type C errors are the final category of mistake. Surprisingly, they occur when the 
level of delegation is locally optimal and the aggregate risk is at a local minimum. In 
military operations with a Type C error, the minimrun level of aggregate risk exceeds the 
risk-bearing capacity of the political leader. In other words, the operation' s expected cost 
is greater than the uti lity ofJXIlitical success. l In such a situation, the very best one can do 
is simply not good enough: the optimal delcgation of control results in a minimized 
aggregate risk that remains excessive. Such a situatiun implies that the operation should not 
be undertaken; means olhcr than military force should be uli li7.ed to pursue the political 
objective. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF RISK SOLUTIONS 
Intcrior aggregate risk solutions arc intuitivdy logical and rational. In fact, it appears 
that must senior JXIlicy-makcrs and military planncrs blindly assume such solutions. The 
5SCC thc appendix fur a more detailed explanation ofexpt:Cted cost and utility. 
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command and control procedures of almost all modem militaries include arrangements by 
whi(;h control over operations is divided beTween political leaders and military commanders. 
In more politically sensitive situations, these procl;.':dun::s usually allow the political leader to 
retain more control; conversely, in very risky military operations, the military conunander 
is delegated more control. Such procedures suggest that most senior policy-makers envision 
thl;.': division of control between the political leader and the military commander to be a 
sumdard method of reducing an operation's overall risk of failure. The possibility of an 
exterior aggregate risk solutions, however, indicates timt such a view is naive and that 
resulting command and control arrangements could result in a Type A or Type B error 
Constant and exterior aggregate risk solution~ in mi litary operatiom are less obviou~ 
and cOlUlter-intuitive. The aggrcgate risk in a constant solution remains at the same level, 
regardle~s of whether the political leader retains all, delegates some, or delegate~ all control. 
Thus, there is no optimal level of delegation. Exterior solutions imply that aggregate risk is 
minimized with either the ]X>litiealleader retaining complete control over the operation or 
delegating all control 10 the military commander. Neither of these options appear very 
practical in the real world. 
The next two chapters explore the nature of different aggregate risk solutions in more 
detail. Chapter V looks at two real world miliiary operations that have interior aggregate risk 
solution~. In addition to providing concrete examples of the application of the model to the 
real world, these case ~tudies will be used as evidence, albeit incomplete, to support the 
validity of the risk model. The follo .. ving chapter, Chapter VI , takes on the more difficult 
question of control over military operations expected to have high levels of both political and 
military risk. Using a hypothetical commando-style special operation as an illustrative 
example, the chapter will explore the inherent conunand and control di lemma faced by 
political leaders and military commanders in such opcration~ and the risk management 
approaches suggested by the model 
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V. EXPLAINING RISK: APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
Tn this chapter, two U. S. military operations oonductcd in thc 1980's, Operation 
URGENT FURY and Opcration EL DORADO CANYON, lIre analyzed using thc risk 
model. These case studies have two purposes: first, to provide additional clarification and 
amplification of the model's mechanics; scoond, to provide evidencc frum thc real world, 
albeit inconclusivc, that validates conelusions drawn from the model and demonstrates their 
usefulncss in explaining the risk dynamics of military operations 
A. TESTING TIlE MODEL 
1, Limitations 
There are inherent difficulties in any attcmpt to test a theory that ineludes risk as a 
dependent variable. Thc first is thc lack ofrcliablc indicators for mcasuring levels of risk. 
Risk is not a tangible object but rather, a concept that can only be measured indirectly. 
AdditionaiJy, the very nature of risk makes it extremely hard to produce even indirect 
evidence. One cannot assume that a high level of risk due to a suboptimal delt:gation of 
control willnceessarily result in a failure. At thc same time, however, a succcss does not 
prove that a high level of risk did not exist. The probabilistic nature of risk, combined with 
the fact that there are additional variables that explain success and failure in military 
operatiolli, severely limit an attempt to provide oonclusive evidence in support of the risk 
model. 
2, Metbodology 
Despitc the difficulties discussed abovc, the following two case studies attempt to 
provide evidence from the real world that supports the relationships postulated and 
conclusions drawn from thc risk model. Both cases involve successful military operations 
that have interior aggregate risk solutions. Each study will demonstrate that the level of 
delegation suggested by the fisk model was approximated by the actual command and 
control ammgcmenls in usc during thc operation. The success of the operation, it is argued, 
was partly due to the fact that the aggregate risk was minimized through (he optimization of 
control. Such a eonclmion tends to validate the concepts of the risk mode!. 
In each study, a brief historical overview is first provided for background 
infonnation. The operation is then examined in light of the key variables identified by the 
risk model. These variables are assessed and the aggregate risk model is constructed. The 
optimwn level of oontrol suggested by the risk model is then compared to the wmmand and 
control procedures utilize<l by the actual politicallcader and military commander; the level 
of delegation suggested by the risk model is shown to approximate the control arrangements 
in use during the operation. 
8 . OPERATION URGENT FURY 
J, Oven'jew 
On 23 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan directed the {;nitcd States armed 
forces to execute a military invasion afthr: Caribbean island Grenada. Operation URGENT 
FER Y wa~ initiated two days later and represented the largest U.S. military lmdertaking 
since the evacuation ofVictnam almost a decade earlier. Before the invasion/rescue mission 
was completed, some 8,000 conventional and special operations personnel from all four 
services had participated in combat operations, supponcd by another 12,000 servicemen 
(Gabriel 1985, 154; Adkin 1989, 128). By allY standard of measure, the operation ha~ been 
judged a success, with both political and military objr:ctives having been effectively attained. 
A small group of observers in the Pentagon and State Department had been paying 
close attention to Grenada since 13 March 1979 when Maurice Bishop and his followers in 
the New JEWEL movement seized power from the unpopular Sir Eric M. Gairy . The new 
Grenadian govennnent had a Marxist-dominated Central Committee that quickly established 
close ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba. In short order, these COlmtries and other 
communist allies were supporting a significant military buildup on the island (Bolger 1988, 
266-268). Although it came to power through unconstitutional means, the Bishop-!ed 
government proved popular with most Grenadians. 
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By 1983, howt':vtr, growing differences between Prime Ministt.'f Dishop and his 
deputy, Bernard Coard proved irn:cuncilable. After rallying the support of party elites, the 
military and the militia, Coard convinced General Hudson Austin to take power in a coup 
on 13 October 1983 and Bishop was placoo under house arrest (Bolger \988, 271). Austin 
declared martial law and replaced the civilian government with his own Revolutionary 
Military Council (RMC). The situation in Grenada deteriorated even further six days later. 
Bishop supporters freed him from detention and persuaded him to fight Austin and the RMC. 
This counterrevolutionary initiative wa:; quickly squelched by Austin and his forws; in the 
aftermath, Bishop and several of his primary supporters were ruthlessly executed. 
The United States watched these events unfold with an ever-increasing interest 
Already concerned with growing communist influence in the region, the Reagan 
administration feared the possibility of the RMC taking American citizens hostagt: and using 
tllcm as bargaining chips in negotiations with the U.S.6 The image of another TdlIan 
nightmare loomed large as national security advisors dcbatcd policy options. When the 
United States received a formal request for a~sistance from the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OEeS) on 21 October, President Reagan responded by authorizing 
Operation URGENT FURY. 
rhc stated political objectives of Operation URGENT FURY were clear and concise. 
Hours after the operation was initiated, President Reagan atUlounced his reasons for ordcring 
thc intervention; 1) to protect innocent lives (cspecially American citizens), 2) the rt:slore 
order on the island, and 3) to replace the illegitimate military council with a democratically 
electcd govemmt:nt (Payne 1984, 154). In hindsight, it is clear there were two additional 
political objectives that wt:re left unstated. As previously mentioned, the United States was 
"Init ial estimates indicated over one thousand American citizens were living in 
Grenada at the time, including approximately 700 medical students at St George's 
Univcrsity School ofMt:dicinc (Payne 1984, 149), Although Ausun initially vowed the 
Americans were free to leave, the discontinuation of telephone, airport and ferry services 
effectively trapped the U. S. citizens (Bolger 1988, 272) 
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eoncemed with the growing influence of communism in the region. Especially worrisome 
was the prospect of Grenada becoming a military outpost of the Soviet Union and its clients. 
Reagan ohviously hoped Operation URGENT FURY would stall further communist military 
expansion in the Caribbean (Adkin 1989, 110). Additionally, the United States desperatcly 
needed to restore the cn:dibility of the its anned forces. On 23 October, a suicide bomber 
staged an attack on the marine barracks in Lebanon resulting in the deaths of241 Americans. 
Since its humble departure from Vietnam, the U.S. military had suffered significant failures: 
the Mayaguez incident, Desert One, and now Lebanon. Clearly, the President hoped 
Operation URGENT FURY would assist in reestablishing the reputation of the Amcrican 
anned forces . 
These political objectives were translated into military ohjectives by U.S. Navy Vice 
Adminu Joseph Metcalf and his staff. Then serving as Commander Second Fleet, Metcalf 
was assigned as the commander of the joint task force assigned with executing Operation 
URGENT FURY (lTF 120). After augmentation from the other services, the m staff 
hastily developed a concept of operations that focused on the following military objectives: 
securing the airports at Puint Salines and Pearls, securing and evacuating American citizens, 
securing and evacuating Governor Generdl Paul Seaon, capturing or destroying the key 
facilities Austin's forces, and capturing or destroying Cuban furces (Bolger 1988, 295). 
Operation URGENT FURY was executed over a period of nine days. After initiating 
operations in the morning hours of25 October, the JTF reported that all military objectives 
were secured by the evening of27 October (Gabriel 1985,173); hosti lities were nut declared 
officially over, however, until 2 November (Adkin 1989, J08). On the first day, marines 
from the 22nd Marine Amphihious Unit (22nd MAU) conducted an air assault and secured 
Pearls airport in the north. Anoy Rangers conducted a parachute assault on the more heavily 
defended Point Salines airport in the south and secured the first of three major groups of 
American citizens. Navy SEALs sent to rescue the Governor General becanle trapped at his 
hOLL~e and had to wait for reinforcements from the marincs on the following day before being 
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able to safely evacuate. The main force, paratroopers from the Anny's 82nd Airbomc Corps, 
began arriving at Point Salines on the afternoon oflhe first day. Over the next 48 hours. 
these joint forces successfully accomplished the prescribed military objectives of Operation 
URGENT FURY' 
2. Analysis 
An application orlhe risk model to Opemtion URGENT FUR Y demonstrates that the 
actual delegation of control t:xercised in the operation approached the optimal level of 
delegation predided by the modeL TIle success orthe operation, it is argued, is partially the 
result of risk minimization through the utilization of an appropriate command and control 
arrangement. 
In the following paragraphs, assessments ofthe risk model's key variables are made 
in light of the conditions surrounding Operation URGENT FURY , Using the ml!thodology 
developed in Ch~pter 111, thl!SI! assessments will be used to detemllnl! the equations that hest 
deserihe the relationships between the risks of military and political failure and the 
delegation of control. 
u. Challenge oj the Tactical Environment 
The challenge of the tactical environment in Operation URGENT FURY is 
assessed as low, with a 1>, • -0.1. Although some estimates of the enemy order of battle 
ineluded m'er seven thousand armed Cubans and Grenadians, evidence exists that suggests 
no senior decision-makers believed Ulesc estimates were accurate. As one anned force critil: 
has noted, 
. in fact, no one at the lCS level ever took thl!se estimates seriously or 
expected mOTe thun one thousand Cuban and Grenadians soldiers to fight. 
Certainly no one expeded them to fight wry well. The night before the 
7This is not to say that the operat ion was flaw lessly executed. nlere were, in fact . 
a number of operational mistakes ~nd sub-task failllICs. In the end, however, the U.S. 
forces prevailed and attained the military obj ectives. For a thorough WId accurate account 
or the operation, sec Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, (Lexington, Massachusells: Lexington 
Books, 1989). 
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invasion. the chairman of the JCS assured the President that American 
casualties would he light and the operation would go quickly. largely because. 
of the number and quality of forces on the island, as wel! as their 
unsophisticated wcapons (Gabriel 1985, 155). 
Although Amcrican forces experienced pockets of strong resistance, thc overall challenge 
presented by the enemy order of battle was low. 
Likewise, the environmental and topogmphical conditions surrounding Operation 
URGENT FUR Y presented few significant challenges. Other than a squall at the beginning 
of the operation, the weather was not a limiting litctor for military activities. The geography 
of Grenada, on thc other hand, was somewhat more challenging. The volcanic landmass was 
dominated by steep hillsides and thick vegetation. Although certainly not insunnountablc, 
these characteristics created some difficulties for force mobility. 
The net assessment is that the challcnge of the tactical environment is as low. 
Because ofthe difficulties poscd by some ofthe topographic factors. the beta is assigned a 
moderak value, p, - -0.1. 
b. Complexity of the Operation 
The complexity of Operation URGENT FURY is assessed as high, with a 
p, • 0.1. The number ofmililary tasks amI subtasks that were expected to be accomplished 
by separate units was unusually high. In his analysis of Operation URGENT FURY's 
"strategic and operational objectives," historian Dan Bolger lists 23 separatc, large-scale 
military tasks (Bolger 1988,295). In addition to being executed by numerous, separate 
components of special operations and conventional forces, these tasks were to he camed out 
without the advantagc of a deliberate planning cycle. In fact, the entire operation was 
"conceived, planned, and launched in four days" (Adkin 1989, 128). The attempt to 
coordinate the activities of some 20,000 personnel in such a short pt:riod of time added to the 
complexity of the operation; eVl;:n routine tasks became more ditlieult with thc lack ofa 
deliberately prepared and weH-hriefed concept of operations. Becausc of the largc number 
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of tasks, the variety of o~rating units and the lack of planning lime, the complexity of 
Operation URGENT FU RY is assessed as high and assigned a modcratcvalue beta, ~, • 0.1. 
C. ReudiJl(!~'s of the Force 
The readiness ofthl: force conducting Opt'ration URGENT FURY is assessed 
as neutral (therefore, ~ J • (J.O). 111c military uni ts involved were adequatdy prepared for the 
required operational tasks and ~ub-tasks. None of the assigm::d missions were uutside the 
operational capabilities oflhe executing wuts. The level of training was generally vcry high. 
The special operations units employed and the 82nd Airborne Corps were always kept at a 
high state of readiness (Holger 1988, 292). The 2200 MAU had recently completed their 
predeploymcnt wurk-up and were embarked for transit to Lebanon (Adkin 1989, 119). On 
the down side, however, there was no chance for rehearsals prior to URGENT FURY 
Additionally, airlift constraints limited some oflhe airbome forces to lUluennanned operating 
units (Adkin 1989, 194) 
d. Complexity of the Political Objective 
111e complexity of the political objectives in Operation URGENT FUR Y is 
assessed as neutral (therefore, "f L • 0.0). TIle number and type of actors President Reagan 
had to deal with were within the capahility of his diplomatic apparatus. The U.S. had good 
re lations with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the OECS. Although the U.S. 
did not have an embassy on Grenada, Milan 8ish, U.S, ambassador to Barbados, did have 
commlmicatjons with the RMC. U.S. and British officials were allowed to fiy to Grenada 
on 22 October and meet with representatives from the RMC and Governor General Seoon 
(Bolger 1988, 272; Adkin 1989, 99). Overall, the U.S. had an adequate capahility to 
coordinate and dfect the desired end-state of Operation URGENT FURY. 
e. Political DYllami.fm 
The dynamism of the political environment in Operation URGENT FURY 
is assessed as low, with a"fL ' -O.OS. The political dynamism refers to the degree to which 
the political environment varies with time. After the RMC coup of 19 October, the overall 
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IXl\itical environment in which President Reagan was operating was remarkably stable. In 
fact , some evidence suggests that the U,S. ignored petitions by the RM"C and Cuba for a 
diplomatic solution to the crisis (Payne 1984, 153). This can be interpreted as an attempt to 
control uncertainty, keep the decision-making environment stable and maintain low polit ical 
dynamism. Because of the unpredictable nature of events in Lebanon, however, the 
variable's gamma is assigned a small value, -0.05. 
f. Linkage 
The linkage between Operation URGENT FURY's military and political 
objectives is a~sessed as high, v.ith a Y,' -0.05. The militaJy objectives of the operation 
closely coincided with the political objectives, leaving little room for disconnects to develop. 
Of the fi ve political objectives previously discussed, three could be attained through military 
action alone. Only two of the objectives, re installing a democratically elected government 
and deterring the spread of communism in the region, required inducing responses from other 
Thus, the linkage is assessed as high, bnt with a relatively small gamma. 
g. Cost of Military Failure and Cost of Political Failure 
In the case of Operation URGENT FURY, the cost ofa military failure and 
the cost of a political failure are assessed as equal to each other and, therefore, each assigned 
a value of I. Beeansc of the high degn.-e of linkage between the military and political 
objectives, a cost of a failure at one level would have been approximately equivalent to the 
cost of a failure at the other. Additionally, both domestic and international audiences were 
sensitive to the operation and had the capability to respond to a failure. Reagan had to face 
the American public in a reelection bid later in the year. International actors had a variety of 
arenas in which to voice criticism: CARlCOM, OECS, The Organization of American Smtcs 
and the United Nations. 
3. Summary 
A summary of the key variable assessments discussed above are presented in Table 
3. Using the methodology developed in Chapter Ill, the equations that best represent the 
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VARIABLE ASSESSMENT BETNGAMMA 
Challenge of the Tactical Environment ~, • ·0.1 
ComplexityofrneOpcration High ~, • 0.1 
Readiness of the Force Neutral ~ , • 0.0 
CoslofMilitaryFailure 
ComplexityoflhePolilicalObj«:livc Neutral yL - O.O 
Political Dynamism Low y, •. 0.05 
Linkage High y) •. 0.05 
CoslofPolilicalFailure N/A 
Table 3. Swnmal") of Key Vanable AnalysIs for OperatIOn URGENT FURY 
risk of military failure and the risk of political failure as a function of the delegation of 
conrrol were detennined to be: 
and are graphed in Figure 21. 
4. Conclusions 
(60) 
The risk model shows that the aggregate risk in Operation URGENT FURY is 
minimized with a level of delegation equal to approximately 0.6.1 This level of delegation 
indicates the military conunander enjoys a significant amount of autonomy in his decision-
making in the planning and execution of the operation. He does not, however, have total 
control over the operation; the political leader retains a smail, but important amount of 
operational oversight. This oversight usually takes the fonn of designat ing fXllitieal 
objectives, issuing general planning guidance and delimiting rules of engagement (ROE). 
II make no attempt to quant ify the exact meaning ofa 0.6 level of delegation. The 
important point is that the aggregate risk is minimized when a large, but not complete, 
amount of control is delegated from the political leader to the military commander. 
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Accounts from the operation indicate these were the exact characteristics of the command 
and control arrangements uti lized by President Reagan and Vice Admiral Metcalf. 
Operation URGENT FURY 
Figure 21. Aggregate Risk in Operation URGENT FURY 
In his study of the operation, Bolger writes: 
URGENT FUR Y succeooeO because President Reagan issued clear strategic 
goals and some general rules of engagement, then left matters to his 
compett:nt military commanders. Reagan refused to pennit political 
interference or civilian t'micromangcmcnt" in the details of the spccial or 
conventional operations. Given the trust ofthc national commander in chief; 
the military establishment creakd a flexible comhat organization that created 
a sound plan and executed it to fulfill the president's objectives. (Bolger 
1988,346) 
Othcr dcscriptions of Reagan's approach to thc delegation of control in Operation URGENT 
FURY confinn Bolger's assessment. For instance, Richard Gabriel writes that "the President 
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placed full operation control oflhe mission in the hands of the office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The JCS had a free hand in both planning and executiun" (Gabriel 19R5, 150). Adkin 
notes that the president did not "interfere with the military side of the operation" (Adkin 
1989, 106). 80th authors also note the uSt: of rules of engagement designed to minimize 
civilian casualties and assist in thl;.': attainment oflhe political objectives (Adkin 1989, 339; 
Gabriel 1985, 176). 
Tills cvidl;:nce suggests that the optimal level of delegation, as predicted by the risk 
modd, matched the levd of delegation actually employed. Ba<.ed on the specific 
circumstanct:s of the situation, Reagan delegated the appropriate lUIlOlmt of control to the 
military commander; this optimization of control minimized the aggregate risk of the 
operations and, therefore, assists in explaining URGENT FURY's successful outcome 
C. OPERATION EL OORADO CA:"!YON 
1. Overview 
EL DORADO CANYON was the la'lt in a series of military exercises and operations 
conducted by the United States with the intent to thwart Libyan state-sponsorship of 
terrorism. Executed in thl: I:arly morning hours of 15 April 1986, the operatiun consisted of 
over 120 Air Force and Navy attack and sUpJXlrt aircraft striking fivl: carefully selected target 
sites in Libya. The targets were effectively engaged and, although Qaddafi faikd to 
completely tl:nninate his associations \'.1th terrorist groups, "detectable LibYllil involvement 
in terrorist activity dropped significantly in 1986 and 1987 after the US air raids in April 
1986" (Zimmennann 1994, 21 7). The forces conducting EL DORADO CANYON 
successfully achieved thl: opl:ffition's military and political objectives. 
Although Libya and its leader, Muammar Qaddafi, had been a constant source of 
aggravation tor the Reagml administration, it was not until Libyan-sponsored terrorism 
threatened United Statl:s interests that the President decided to act. After twu years of 
abstinence, Libyan-sponsored tcrrori~"ts reemerged on the international sccnc and conducted 
15 atk1cks in 1985 (Martin 1988, 259). Ln the afimnath of thl: Beirut bombing in 1984, the 
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United States had become more sensitive to the threat posed by terrorists. As part of an 
increasingly aggressive anti-terrorist policy, Secretary of State Shultz announced that the 
United States was seriously considering "more active means of defense -- about defense 
through appropriate preventative or preemptive actions against terrorists groups hefore they 
strike" (Zimmermann 1994, 201). Later, in July 1985, President Reagan openly 
acknowledged that the United States faced threats equaling "acts of war" by the terrorists and 
his administration prepared general plans to enable the United States "to bit back at the 
terrorists" (Davis 1990,70). The stage was set for the showdown with Libya. 
The incident that ini tiated the series of events leading to Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON occurred on 27 December \985. Terrorists from the Libyan-sponsored Abu Nidal 
terrorist group conducted simultaneous grenade and gunfire attacks at the Rome and Vienna 
airports. Twenty people (five Americans) were ki lled including an eleven year old American 
girl. Evidence gathered after the incident implicated both Syria and Libya in the attacks 
(Davis 1990,80-81 ). The day after the incident, Qaddafi called the attacks "heroic 
operations" and over the next few weeks engaged in open threats of terrorist attacks un 
American soil (Davis 1990, 79-81) . 
lbe initial United States response consisted of econumic embargoes against Libya. 
This action lacked significant leverage, however, because Westcrn allies in Europe were 
generally reluctant to go along with the United States' initiative. To increase its coercive 
pressure, during the months of January and February 1986, the United States conducted two 
"Freedom of Navigation" exercises in intemational waters north of Qaddati's self-declared 
"line of death." These exercises amounted to a show of force designed to coerce Qaddafi 
into abandoning the sponsorsrup of international terrorism . 
Continued Libyan defiance caused an escalation in the mWleuvers. With the arrival 
of a third aircraft carrier in March, U.S. naval forces conducted a third "Freedom of 
Navigation" exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. This time, however, sume of the ships operated 
in international waters south ufthe "line of death." Libyan anti-aircraft missile siks and fast 
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attack patrol boats attempted to engage these American forces but were illlsuccessfui. u.s. 
eOlmler-actions resulted in the sinking of three patrol boats and the partial dcsmlction of om:: 
missile sile. 
While the preceding evetl!s clearly escalated the crisis between the United States and 
Libya, it was two It:rrorist incidents in carly April that served as the final catalysts for 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON. On 2 April, a bomb exploded on TWA Flight 840 from 
Rome to Alhens, kill ing fOUI people, all ofthcm American. The Libyan-backed Abu Nidal 
group claimed responsibility for the attack, although evidence gathcrcd later indicated a 
Syrian-sponsored, pro-PLO organization was behind the bombing (Davis 1990, 110: Martin 
1988,285). Regardless of who "vas culpable, this incident incn:ased the desire of President 
Rcagan to take action against international terrorism 
The final catalyst wa<; an incident that occurred in Bcrlin on 5 April. A bomb 
exploded in the crowded La Delle nightclub, killing three people and injuring 229 others. 
The cluh was a popular nightspot for U.S. scrvicemen in Berlin; ofthe bombing's victims, 
two of those killed were American as were 79 of the injured. With the assistance oflhe 
British, the U.S. soon received communication ink:rceplS between Tripoli and the Libyan 
East Berlin People's Bureau that ckarly linked Libya to the bombing (Davis 1990, 116; 
Martin 1988, 285). President Reagan now had clear justification to acl and authorized 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON on 6 April. 
The political objectives ofthe operation wen: clearly stated by the President in his 
announcement of Operation EL DORADO CANYON to the American public. First and 
foremost, the airstrikes were "preemptive actions against terrorist installations" designed to 
"diminish Qaddafi's capacity to export terror." Additionally, it was hoped that the operation 
would "provide him with incentives and rea')Qns to alter his criminal behavior." Finally, the 
President admitted that he hcld "no illusion that tonight's action would hring down the 
curtain on Qaddati's reign of terror" but did believe the operation would "bring closer a safer 
and more secure world for decent men and women." (Davis 1990, 139) 
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The political objectlves were translated into a scries of carefully selectcd airstrikes 
against five target sites. Under the operational command of Vice Admiral Frank B. Kclso , 
Air Force and naval aircraft would engage military objectives in both the Tripoli and 
Bcnghazi area. In the vicinity of Tripoli , the target sites included: (I) Aziziyah Barracks, 
Qaddafi's personal compound and command and control center; (2) the Tripoli Military 
airfield; and (3) the Murat Sidi Bilal compound, a known training facility for terrorist 
frogmen. In the Benghazi area, the targets included: (4) thc Benina airfield and (5) 
lamahiriyah Barracks, Qaddafi's alternate command and control facility. The common 
theme among the targets was that all the sites were clearly elements of Libya's command, 
training and support infrastructure for the sponsorship ofintemational terrorism. 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON commenced on the afternoon of 14 April 1986 
when U.S. Air Force tankl:rs and support aircraft took off from airfields in the United 
Kingdom. Followed shortly afterward hy the primary attack aircraft, 18 F -I l l's, this air 
annada began the long journey to their targets in Tripoli. The French refusal to grant 
overflight permission to the U.S. dictated a dogleg flight plan with a round-trip distance of 
almost 3,000 miles. After four in-flight rcfuclings, the F-Ill 's started their attack profiles 
to engage their targets. With their fi rst bombs on target at exactly 0200 GMT as planned. 
the F -I I J 's effectively cngaged the three T ripoJi target sites and were on their way home 
eleven minutes later. Of the 18 aircraft comprising the strikes, 11 bombed as planned, five 
aborted their attacks, one missed the attack due to navigational errors and one aircraft was 
lost at sea. (Bolger 1988,419-425) 
As the Air Force armada was making it.;; way toward Tripoli, thl: U.S. Navy was busy 
making preparations fo r the strike against the Benghazi targets. Thc carriers America and 
Coral Sea launched over 70 aircrafi that would attack the Benghazi targets, suppress Libyan 
air defenses and provide local fightcr protection for the F-ll1's over Tripoli. Like their 
counterparts from the U.K., the carrier aircraft hit their targets at exactly 0200 GMT. Of the 
27 attack aircraft scheduled to bomb, 24 hit their target, two aborted on their attack run and 
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onc aborted on the carrier. By 0253, all aircraft had been recovered onhoard the carriers; 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON WdS over. (Bolger 1988,419-425) 
2. Analysis 
fis in the case of Operation URGENT FURY, a risk model examination ofOpcration 
EL DORADO CI\NYON reveals that the actual delegation of control exercised in the 
operation approached the optimal level of delegation predicted by the modeL The success 
of the operation, then, is partially due to the minimization of aggregate risk through the 
uti lization of an appropriate cOnuTIand and cuntrol arrangement. 
In the following paragraphs, assessments of thl;.': risk model's key variables are made 
in light uflhe circrunstanccs surrounding Operation EL DORADO CAt "'lYON . As in the last 
case study, these assessments ""ill be used to dctcnninc the equations that best describe the 
relationships between the risks of mili tary and political failure and the delegation of control. 
j\fter plouing the aggregate risk solution, this section wiil compare the optimal and actual 
conunand and control arrangements. 
a. Challenge of the Tactical Environment 
The chalJengc of the tactical environment in Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON is assessed as low, with a Il, . -0.1. Thc primary thrcat to the Amcrican forces 
was the Lihyan air defense system. Although the weapons it manncd had significant 
capabilities, the Lihyan Arab Air Ddense Command was "grossly understaffed, 
characterized by poor equipment maintenance, and probably left much to be desired in 
quality of training" (Davis 1990, 135) . CDR Byron Duff, the air wing commander onboard 
the carrier Coral Sea remarked prior to the operation, "Outside of Syria ami the Soviet 
Union, Libya has the best eqnipment in the world, whether they ca.n operate it is another 
question" (Martin 1988, 269) . Encounters with Libyan missile systems and aircraft in the 
preceding months had clearly r.kmonstrated that Qaddafi's "men did not know how to cmploy 
thcir sophisticated weaponry" (Bolger 1988,401). 
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Environmental and topographical conditions for the operation were generally 
fitvorable. Thc only topographical factor that posed a challengc was the location of Aziziyah 
Rarracks; it wa~ situated in the middle ofa congested area ofurhan Tripoli. Because of the 
desire to avoid civilian casualties, the physical location of this target site made it a more 
difficult target than the rest. Aziziyall Barracks were, however, still well within the 
capabilities of thc assigned forces. 
The net assessment is that the challenge of the tactical environment is low. Because 
of the difficulties posed by the location of Aziziyah Barracks, the beta is assigned a moderate 
value, ~, • -0.1 
b. Complexity of the Operation 
The complexity of Operation EL DORADO CANYON is assessed as neutral 
(therefore, Il, . 0.0). Achieving the mission's military objectives was dependent on, in 
essence, the additive result of each separate bombing crew's actions, not thc synergistic effect 
of the mUltiple airstrikes. The success of the operation, however, did require a moderate 
degree of interdependency among the forces conducting thc strikes. The plan ca]!ed for 
simultaneous hits at all target sites to help achieve an element of surprise; the suppression 
of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions flown by some of the naval aircraft helped achieve 
air superiority for both naval and Air Force attack aircraft; the support of the tanker aircraft 
was esscntial to the employment of the F-Ill 'so Overall, the munbcr ofinterdependcnt tasks 
required to be perfonned in Operation EL DORADO CANYON was within the capablHties 
of the operating units; the complexity, thcrefore, is assesscd as ncutral. 
c. Readiness of the Force 
The rcadiness of the forces conducting Operation EL DORADO CANYON 
is assessed as high, \vith a II" -0.1. The naval and Air Force crews conducting thc 
operation were more than adequately prepared for the tasks and sub-tasks required by their 
operational assignments. Both carriers and their embarked airwings had operated in thc 
vicinity ofLihya in the "Freedom of Navigation" exercises in the prcviolls months and had 
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actually engaged Libyan forces in the melee of 24 March. The naval aviators "knew their 
cnemy's antiaircraft procedures, electronic signatures, ami missile sites quite well hy April 
1986. Libya was familiar territory to Illllily American fliers" (Bolger 1988,410). 
The Air Force wilts were almost equally well-prepared. At the beginning ufthc year, 
as contingency planning for possible operations against Libya was initiated, the F- i ll's 
based in England began rehearsing long-di~1anCC, multiple-refueling attack profiles to a 
bombing range nell[ Incirlik, Turkey (\1artin 1988, 274), These rehearsals were very similar 
to the profiles necessary to hit targets in Tripoli. During these practice mns, the crews 
developed and perfected the special procedures that would be n:quired if France failed to 
grant overflight permission . The only difficulty arose when the draft Air Force mission 
tasking was changed four days before the strikes; the change increased the nwnber of aircraft 
that would be required for the operation. Although thc additional aircrews did not have the 
bcnefit of the Incirlik rehearsals, their training for the F-I I I's standard wartime tasking 
prepared thcm for the Libya mission. "Thc bombing tactics" they would use "against targets 
in Libya were the same oncs thcy practiced for targcts in Central Europe: low-level, 
nighttime nms that uscd the F-111 's terrain-following radar" (Martin 1988,273). 
The overal l assessment of the readiness of the force is high. Becausc of the 
difficulties posed by the last minute switch to a larger Air Force package, the beta is assigned 
a moderate value, p, • -0.1 
tL Complexity of the Political Objective 
rhc complexity of the political objectives in Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON is assessed as neutral (therefore, Y, ' 0.0). On the one hand, the complexity 
appeared low hecause the desired end-state of the operation was dependent on the a.;tions of 
onJy one political leader. On the other hand, the political target of these efforts was far from 
a traditional statesman; Qaddafi was mure of a revolutionary zt:alot than a conventional 
diplomat. Further adding to the complexity was the fact that the u .s. had closed its embassy 
in Tripoli in 1980; both countries did, however, maintain formal diplomatic re lations 
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1I1roughout this time period (Davis 1990, 38). The net impact of these factors was to 
cstablish a neutral levcl of complexity in the political objectives. 
e. Political Dynamism 
The dynamism of the political environment in Opemtion EL DORADO 
CANYON is assessed as neutral (therefore, Y,' 0.0). Based on the U.S.'s previous 
experiences with Qaddafi, it appeared highly unlikely that he would suddenly cede to the 
American demands. If Qaddafi did so cede, howcver, and the U.S. continued with its 
planned airstrikes, the result would have certainly been a political failure. The political 
environment surrounding Operation EL DOR.A.DO CANYON was neither especially 
dynamic nor static. 
f. Linkage 
Like the other variables affecting the probability of political failure, the 
linkage between the military and political objectives in Operation EL DORADO CANYON 
is assessed a~ neutral (therefore, Y, ' 0.0). The military objectives of the operation were 
carefully selected to ensure a direct relationship with the political objectives. President 
Reagan had made it clear that he was wining to use "force as an instrument of 
counterterrorism only ifit could target people or facilities directly related to the terrorism" 
(Zimmermann 1994,205). Thc military objectives, however, were limited in nature and 
would not totally destroy Qaddafi's terrorism support infrastructure. '[be airstrikes were 
more of a messagc than they were a hammer. As a result, the linkage between the military 
and political objectivcs was incomplete; attainment of the political objective depended on 
inducing the appropriate response from Qaddafi. 
g. Co!>·t of Military Failure alld Co!>·t of Political Failure 
As in the previous case study, the cost ofa military failure and the oost ofa 
political failure in Operation EL DORADO CANYON are assessed as equal to each other 
and, therefore, each assigned a value of l. A military failure could have increased the 
prestige of Libya and it~.; armed forces in the eyes orthe world, regardless ofthe reason!; for 
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the failure. Qaddafi and his revolutionaries would be seen as having successfully stood up 
to the imperialist Yankees. A political failure, on the other hand, would result in continued 
Libyan-sponsored international terrorism. The military operation itself might be seen as 
justification for not only Qaddafi's status quo level of terrorist activities, bnt even an 
increase. In either case, the ongoing confrontation between the U.S. and Libya had 
sensitized both domestic and international audiences to the potential for a military operation. 
Additionally, each audience had a wide variety of means tu respond to a failure. Both the 
wst of military failure and the cost of political failure were equal ly intimidating. 
3. Summary 
A summary of the key variable assessments discussed above are presented in Table 
4 Using the methodology developed in Chapter III, the equatiuns that best represent the risk 
of military failure and the risk of political failure as a function ofthe delegation of control 
were detemlined to be; 
RMF - 0.8 '.fDc 
and are graphed in Figure 22. 
4. Conclusions 
(6\) 
The aggregate risk solution for Operation EL DORADO CANYON indicates that the 
optimal level of delegation is approximately 0.2. As before, the purpose of the risk model 
is nut to distinguish the difference between a 0.2 level of delegation and a 0.3 level; what is 
of concern is that the risk model indicates the optimal command and control arrangements 
involve the political leader retaining a large amolUlt of control, but not lotal control, over the 
operatiun. An amlysis of the relationship between the political leader, President Reagan, and 
the military commander, Vice Admiral Kelso, reveals that the actuallcvel of delegation 
utilized in the operation was similar to the optimal level of delcgl"llion predicted by the 
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modeL The success of the operation, it is argued, is at least partially the result of risk 
minimization through the optimization of control. 
President Reagan and his National Security Council (NSC) staff exercised close 
control over many aspects of Operation EL DORADO CANYON. Specifically. they were 
heavily involved in the operation's target selection and efforts to minimize civilian casualties. 
As previously discussed, the President insisted on a high degree of linkage between the 
targets and Qaddafi's involvement in terrorism. He and his staff closely reviewed the 
proposed target list before the execution of the operation. In fact, the President was 
personally responsible for adding Aziziyah Barracks to the final list oftargds (}vlartin 1988 , 
28&; Zimmermmill 1994, 214). 
VARlABLE ASSESSMEN"l BETA/GAMMA 
Challenge of the Tactical Environment Low ilL' -0.1 
Compl~xity of the Opt'r.ltion Neutral 11, - 0.0 
Readinessoftbe Force High 1>, --0.1 
Cost ufMilitary Failure 
Comple~ity ofthe Political Objective Neutral Y, _ 0.0 
Political Dynamism Neutral Y, · O.O 
Linkage y, _ 0.0 
Cost of Political Failu re NiA 
Table 4. Swnmary of Key Vanable Anal) SIS forOpcratlOn EL DORADO CANYON 
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Operation EL DORADO CANYON 
_ ..;:;] 
o:t // 
A~ ~ '~--- ---
I<igure 22, Aggregate Risk in Operation EL DORADO CANYON 
The Presiut:nt's mandaI\: to minimize civilian casualties was reflected in the strict 
ROE issued to the aircrews and the tactics utilized in thl:: strikes: 
Tht: crews were forbidden tu drop their bombs unles~ they could make 
redundant positive target identification on multiple aiming systems; 
additionally, the use of standoff tactics to avoid risking the crews' lives in 
Oight over the targets was rejecte<i in order to minimize civilian casualtie~. 
(Davi~ 1990, 135) 
13e\:ause of these strict, "double-lock" ROE, seven aircraftabortcd their bombing runs during 
the operation when component~ aftheir navigation and targeting sy~tems faikd (Bolger 
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19118,423). Though the use of ROE, the President had exercised a large degree of indirect 
political control over the execution of the operation. 
\Vhile President Reagan maintained a great deal of control over the operation, he did 
not exercise total control. Mindful of the danger of retaining too much control, Reagan 
"insisted that [Vice Admiral] Kelso control the timing and details of any attack" (Bolger 
1988,416). In fact, many of the "more dctailed aspects, such as munitions loadings and 
attack profiles were handled by more junior military conunanders in the European theater" 
(Davis \990, \\9) 
The details presented here suggest that thc optimal level of delegation, as predicted 
by the risk model, matched the level of delegation actually employed. Based on the specific 
circumstances sUITmmding Operalion EL DORADO CANYON, the political leader retained 
the appropriate level of control and minimized the opcration's aggregate risk. This risk 
minimization through the optimization of control helps to explain Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON's successful outcome. 
D. EV ALVA TING THE EXPLANATIONS 
As discussed at thc onset of this chapter, dcfinitively testing the risk model is 
inherently difficult, if not impossible. The case studies presented here, therefore, are 
admittedly inconclusive in nature and fail to absolutely prove the validity of the concepts on 
which the model is based. Additionally, the assessmcnts and beta assignments made for the 
model's kcy variables in these ca<;e studies are suhjective; others may havc legitimate 
arguments with the a<;sessments made or their supporting justifications. Such arc the 
difficulties in attempting to grapple with concepts as vague as risk in military operations. 
These critiques notwithstanding, it appears the model provides a useful guide to the 
general level of delegation must appropriate for the command and control arrangements of 
a particular military operation. The first case study demonstrates the usefulness of 
decentralized control when the political situation permits a high level of delegation tu the 
military commander. In Operation URGENT FURY, the military risks dominated the 
political risks; the decentralized ~pproach to cununand and oontrol that was exercised 
efkctively reduced the aggregate risk and granted the military commander the flexibility 
required to handle the military risks. 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON, on the other hand, illustrates thlo: necessity for 
centralized control when Lhe political risks dominate the military risks. The average risk of 
political [ailme coupled with the rclativdy low fisk of military failure required the political 
leader retain a high level of control to reduce the operation's aggregate risk and provide 
himselfwilh the flexibility necessitated by \hI;.': political environment 
The fisk model, then, appears to be an accurate barometer for the degree of 
centralized control appropriate to a particular military operation . But what of military 
operations in which both the risk ofmililary fai ltue and the risk of political tailure are high 
and neither dominates? Such a situation is typical of special operations and the command 
and control dilemma is expected to he greatly amplified in such cirewnstanees. How docs 
one interpret. and what are the implications of the model's aggregate risk solutions for such 
operations? These questions are the subject of the next chapler. 
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VI. PREDICTlNG RrSK: SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND Tlffi RISK MODEL 
A. r liRPOSE 
Tn the preceding chapters, we have developed a model for analyzing risk in military 
operations and demonstrated its usefulness in explaining the dynamics of risk in selected 
historical cases. In this chapter, we shift our focus to the funlTe and use the model to predict 
risk in hypothetical operations, specifically, special operations. The ultimate goal, uf course, 
is to detennine the conunand and control arrangements fur such operations that minimize 
exposure \0 aggregate risk. 
There an: two primary reasun:; for looking al special operations. First, such 
operations arc increasingly important to the national security strategy ufthe United States. 
As General Wayne Downing, Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations 
Command recently noted, ~pecial operation:; forces (SOF) an: "in demand oversea<; because 
we havl: some unique skills that this country needs in this era of international I.;hallenge" 
(Downing 1995, 11). Additionally, special operations are nonnally associakd with high 
polit ical risks and high military risks. As a result, the command and control dilemma can 
be expected to be greatly amplified in such operations a<; the poli tical leader and military 
commander struggle for control in an attempt to minimize their respectiw risk. An 
app lication of the risk model to a spel.; ial operation, therefore, provides an excdk nt 
opportuni ty to demonstrate its usefulness in the management of the command and control 
dilcnlllla. 
B. S]'EClAL OPERATlO:."lS 
L. Definition and Characteristics 
Before using the model to analyze risk in special operations, a look at thl: ddinition 
and charactcristics of such operations is required. The United States military definl:~ ~pecia l 
operatIOns as: 
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operations conducted by specially organized, trained and t:quipped military 
and paramilitary forces to achit:ve military, political, economic, or 
psychological ohjt:ctivcs hy unoonventional military means in hostile, denied, 
or politically sensitive areas. Tht:se operations arc conducted during 
peacetime competition, wnflict, and war, indcpendently or in coordination 
with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces, Politil:a1-
military wnsiderations frequently shape spC(;ial opt:rations, rt:quiring 
clandestine, covert, or low visibility tcchniques and oversight at the national 
level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degrce of 
physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 
independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational 
intelligence and indigenous assets. (Joim Pub 3-05 1992, GL-20) 
Several elements of this definition warrant closer inspection. 
The definition emphasizes that SOF are "specially organized, trained, and equipped 
military" units specifically designated fOf employment in special operations. SOF doctrine 
states that such personnel "undergo lengthy sdection processes and extcnsive mission 
specific training progranls above hasic military skill training." These military mIits "are 
often organized jointly and routinely plan, cxecutc, wmmand and control operations from 
a joint perspectivc." In order to develop and maintain their special skills, SOF are directed 
by doctrine to "train and exercise under oonditions resembling the operational environment 
in which they intend to tight." N; a result, most SOF components are regionally focused in 
order to maintain a "capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the 
area's environment.al conditions." (Joint Pub 3-05 1992, 1-6) 
The definition also stresses the political aspects of special operations. Political 
considerations nonnally exert a great irilluence on the planning and execution of special 
operations. SOF doctrine states that special operations arc "usually of high physical and 
political risk ... often principally politico-military in nature ... and suhject to oversight at 
the nat ional level. (Joim Puh 3-051992, 1-4) 
2. Commando and Unconventional Special Operations 
l11ere are five principal mission areas for SOF: direct action, special recomoossance, 
counterterrorism , fore ign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Direct action 
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optTations are generally small-unit, ofTen:;ive strikes against key enemy targets. Spe(;iai 
recom13issance, nlso blO\\ll as "eyes on target," is usually concerned with the collection of 
intelligence in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas. Counterterrorism operatiuns scc.k 
to preempt or resolve terrorist incidents. F'orcign internal defense missions attempt to train 
and advise the military and paramilitary forces of developing states with the goal of 
preparing such forces for counterinsurgency operations. Unconventional warfare is an 
umbrella tenn used to describe the relakd tactics of guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and 
subversion as they apply to sllpponing insurgencies. 
These wide-ranging mission areas can be usefully categorized into two hasic roles 
for SOF: unconventional and commando_ The unconventional role is distinguished by the 
employment ofSOF to "influencc, advise, train and conduct operatiuns with forei gn forces 
and populations." Operations in the unconventional warfare and forcign internal defense 
mission arcas clearly fall imo this role. Generally, um;onventional operations are wnducted 
over extended pcriods of time and "require a paticnt, long-ternl conunitment in order to 
achievc nationll1 ubjectives." The characteristic long-tenn duration of such operations make 
it diffic ult to apply the fisk model; the key variables of the model are li kely to vary 
significantly over the period oflhe uperation. (Lamb 1995,4) 
The second ba'>ic role for SOF is as commandos. In this role, SOF use "stealth, speed 
and audacity to undertake precision penetration and strike operations in limitcd, specialized 
contingencies across the conflict spectrum." TIle di rcct action, special reconnaissan(;e and 
counterterrorism mission areas fall into the commando role- Commando operations arc 
characterized as "short, self-contained .. missions that stress unorthodoxy, spe(;ial training 
and unique intelligence." As we explore risk in special operations, our foc us will be un 
operations that fall into this role; the general naMe and short duration of conunando 
operations alluws one to make credible generalizations and more accurate assessments ufthe 
risk model's key variahles . (Lamb 1995, 4) 
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C. RISKIN COMMANDO OPERATIONS 
In this section, we will apply thc risk model to commando op:!rations. The doctrinal 
dcfinitions and characteristics of such operations, as previously discussed, will serve as the 
basis for evaluating the risk model's key variables. 
1. Analysis of Key Variables 
The key variables affecting the probahili ty of military failure in a commando 
operation are all assessed at a neutral level and, therefore, have a beta of 0.0. Such an 
a%essment may appear counter-intuitivc at tirst glance; SOF are generally considered highly 
ready troops with specializcd training in their expected mission area~ and operational 
environments. These remarks arc true when comparing SOF relative to conventional forces 
Relative to the commando operation at hand, however, SOF arc most accurately described 
as "adequately prepared" vice "exceptionally well prepared" for the inherent challenge of its 
tactical environment, complexity of the operation (Uld required military tasks and sub-tasks 
These key variabks, therefore, are assessed at ncutrallevels. 
In general, the complexity of political ohjectives in commando operations can he 
assessed as low, with a moderate value gan1ma,"11 = -0.1. Commando operations are usually 
directed against state, rathcr than non-state, actor:>. While the desired cnd state of 
unconventional operations may depend on the actions of a wide variety of state and non-stale 
actors, commando operations are employed to achieve a specific goal or send a specific 
mcssagc to a specific political actor. In such situations, thc nwnber and type of actors with 
which a political leader must inkract are well within the capahilities of his diplomatic 
apparattls. 
In contra~1 to the low level of complexity in their political objectives, commando 
operations normally exhibit a high degree linkage and are usually executed in political 
environments with a high level of dynamism. As previously mentioned, commando 
opt!rations are employed tn achieve a specific goal or send a specific message to a specific 
political actor; thus, there is normally a very deliberate and explicit coupling between the 
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military objective and the political objective. As will be further discussed in the nr:x.t 
paragraph, technological advances have hrought about a general increase in thl;': pace of 
diplomatic negutiations and, as a natural extension, in the dynamism of the political 
enviromncnt. 
In conunando operations, the cost of a military failure and the cost of a political 
fai lure are assessed as equal 10 each other and, thereforI;.': , t':3ch assigned a value of I. The 
primary reason for this assessment is the "CNN effect." Rising litt:ra9 rates around the 
world, the proliferation of intemational media organs and the advances in tde-
communications technology have created a geo-political environment in which a tactical 
t':ITor can result in a strategic fail ure. Tht: st:nsitivity of both dome~ti(; and intemational 
audiences have risen, as havt: tht:ir ffit:lli1S to effectively respond to both military and political 
failures. These recent changes and the high degree of linkage combine to blur the 
distinctions oclween military and politi(;al objectives in commando opt:rations; the "banles" 
become "wars" and the "wars" become "banks." As a result, the costs of a military failure 
lU"e indistingnishable from the costs of a political failure 
2. Summary 
A summary of the key variable assessments discussed above are presented in Table 
5. Using the methodology developed in Chapter 11 1, the equations that best represent the risk 
of military fai lure and the risk of political failure as a function of the delegation of eontro] 
are detcnnined to be: 
0.1 (62) 
and graphed in Figure 23. 
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VARIABLE ASSESSMENT BETA/GAMMA 
Chall~ngeoflheTactical Environment Neutral ~, . 0.0 
Complexity of the Operation Neutral ~, • 0.0 
Readine~s oflhe Force ~, . 0.0 
Cost of Military Failure 
ComplexityoflhePolilicalObjeclivc Y, ' -0.1 
PolilicalDynamism High Y, · O.I 
linkage High Y, . -0.1 
COSI of Pol iii cal Failure 
Table 5. Summary of Key Variable Assessment fo r Commando OperatIOns 
Risk in Commando Operations 
Figure 23 Aggregate Risk in Commando Operations 
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COMMANDO 
Ol'ERATIONS 
Analysis of the aggregate risk solution shown in Figure 23 reveals two important 
observations concerning the conunand and control of commando operations. First, the fact 
that commando operations have interior risk solutions implies that it is possihle \0 effectively 
minimize risk in such operations through the optimization of control. In this example, risk 
is minimized with a level of delegation of approximately 0.44. TIms, the optimal command 
and control arrangement for commando operations would involve procedures that delegate 
slightly less than half of thl: control from the political leader to the military commander. 
Such an arrangement minimizes risk and provides for the mo~i e[fl;.':ctivc means of managing 
the inherent command and control dilcnuna. 
The second important observation from an analysis of the aggregate risk solution for 
commando operations is that a Type B error (too much delegation) is preferable to a Typt: 
A error (not enough delegation) in the conunand and control arrangements. The ~Iope of the 
aggregate risk curve in Figure 23 rises more quickly to the left of the optimization poillt than 
it does to the right. Additionally, the aggregate risk rises to a value of 1.0 with an extreme 
Type A error, as opposed to a value of 0.9 with a comparable Type B error. TIle conclusion 
to be drawn is non-trivial: in geneml, it is advantageous for the political leader to tavor more 




A. MODEL ASSK~SME:VI' 
The preceding chapters have highlighted the strengths and usefulness of tht': risk 
model developed in this thesis: it provides a systematic methodology for thinking about risk 
in military operations; it introduces the concept of aggrt:gak: risk. ami provides a tool for 
wldcrst:mding the command and control dilemma; finally, it provides a framework for 
enhancing operational success through a strategy of fisk management. The model is not, 
however, without its weaknesses. TIlis section briefly addresses what I consider are the l~e 
primary weaknesses oflhe model 
First and foremost, the risk model assumes that the military commander makes his 
decisions in a political Yocuum and thaI su(;h de(;isions are ba:;eu only on military 
preferences. This assumption was necessary for simplicity, but it led to thc model's 
generalized high probability of political failure when the political leader dekgates a 
signifi<:wlt amount ofwnlrolto the mililw)" <:ommaooer. In reality, no military decision is 
made with such total disregard to political considerations. We would expect, therefore, that 
the political and aggregate risk curves in the real world are actually "flatter" than those 
generated by the mood. 
A second weakness in the model is its asswnption ofa linear baseline reiaLionship 
bl;":[ween the delegation of control and probability of a military or political failure. Again, 
this assumption was made to keep the model as simple as possible. One can imagine. 
however, that this relationship may be more accurately described by a step fUll<:tion than a 
linear one. A step function would inui<:aie that there exists a threshold level of delegation 
at which the probability of failure exhibit"' a large change; both below and above this 
threshold kvd of delegation. the probability of failure would exhibit small marginal changes 
Such a baseline relationship may more accurately reflect the nature of risk in military 
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operations, but would also add a level of complexity to the model that might negate it 
analytic u~cfulness. 
The final weakness ofthe risk model is its lack of an opcrationalizcd "delegation of 
control continuwn." What docs 0.3 units of "ddcgation of control" look like in the real 
world and what distinguishes it from level of 0.2 or 0.4? As presented in this thcsi~, the risk 
model indirectly avoids these questions hy relying on generalized characteristics of "more" 
and "less" delegation. Such generalizations arc acceptable in an exploratory work such as 
thi~, but a more specific discussion of the "delegation of control continuum" in practical 
tenns would increase the usefulness of the model. 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, I believe that the risk model devc1opt.:d in this 
thesis provides not only a useful tool fo r Wlderst.1nding the nature of the command and 
control di lemma but also the means for managing its effects 
B. RISK AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL DILEMMA RF,YISTTED 
lbe political and military risks associated with a military operation serve as powerful 
catalysts [or the struggle over control. Political ri~ks increase the desire for control by the 
political leader who wants to ensure the tactical objectives and means are cornistent with the 
existing political requirements. Military risks, on the other hand, increase the desire for 
control by the military leader; he desires maximum autonomy in order to effectively conduct 
the hattie and respond 10 contingencies. Thus, each leader is driven by his perception of risks 
to struggle for increased control over the operation. The end result is the command and 
control dilemma: a natural tension between the political leader and military commander, 
between the need to maintain control and the need to delegate. 
The model developed in this thesis provides a conceptual framework for analyzing 
the risks faced by each leader and these risks' relationship to each other. The thesis shows 
that an operation's ovtrall risk, or aggregate risk, is the sum of the military risk and the 
political risk. The compont:nt.~ of these risks, "costs of failure" and "probability of failure," 
arc examined along with the significant factors that affect each. The mathematical model 
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fonnulated in Chapter III provides a mechanism for examining the variations in an 
operation's mili tary, political and aggregate risk as a function of the delegation of control. 
The resulting insight into the dynamics of risk in mil itary operations allo""~ for the effective 
management of the command and control dilemma. 
In every military operation, a command structure is organized for the execution of 
the plan and the control of the milit.1f)· units; this establishment of a command relationship 
between the political leader and military conumlilder implies the delegation of same degree 
of autonomous decision-making authorit)'. The paradigm fostered hy the fisk model shifts 
the focus away [rom the command and control dilenuna's inherent struggle over control; 
instead, the model sharply focuses both the political leader and military conunandcr on 
minimizing aggregale risk through the optimization of control. The utilization of command 
and control arrangements that refieet the optimum level of delegatioo, as detennint:r.1 by the 
risk mood, results in the minimum possible exposure to overall risk and improves the 
probability of a successful military operation. 
C. PRECEPTS FON.. RISK MANAGEMENT 
In addition to the stmtegy of risk minimization just discussed, an analysis of the 
conceptual framcwork provided by the risk model also yields a set of general precepts for thc 
management of risk in military operations. Obviously, the minimization of aggregate risk 
is the most effective means of enhancing mission success. A useful secondary goal, 
however, is to "lower" the whole aggregate risk curve. Any individual action that lowers 
either the component military or political risk curvc will result in a lower aggregate risk 
regardless of the level of delegation. It follows that the political leader and the military 
commander should endeavor to take those actions that would result in lower assessments of 
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one or more of the risk model's key variables. As a result, the following precepts for risk 
management in military opt:rations can be derived from the model developed in this thesis: 
• Ensure the force is prepared for the opcrdtion's tactical envirorunent. 
• Ensure the force is prepared for the operation's required military tasks 
• Minimize the number of sequentiaUsimuitaneous tasks required by the operation. 
• Keep the operation's desin:d end-state as simple as possihle. 
• Attempt to minimize variations in the operation's political environment. 
• Maximizl: the coupling between the operation's military ohjeetive and its political 
objective. 
The greater the dl:gree to which these precepts arc accomplished during the planning, 
preparation and execution of military operations, the lower the overall aggregate fisk 
exposure and the grl:3ter the prospect of mission success. 
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APPENDIX. PROOF OF THE ADDITIVE NATURE OF RISK IN I\fILiTARY 
OPERATIONS 
For the purposes of this thesis, a military operation is defined as the tactical 
application of force employed by a statt: in the pursuit of specific military objectives that 
contribute to the attainment ofan overall political objective A graphical representation of 
this definition is presented in Figure 24 . 
Figure 24. Dtagram ofMlhtary OperatIOn 
The success of any military operation requires I) that the military objective is 
appropriately determined and attained, and 2) that the political objective is appropriately 
ddennined and attained. Each objective is a m:cessary but not sufficient condition for 
success. There are, therefore, two ways in which a military operation can fail: militarily and 
politically. A military failure occurs when the political objective of a military operation is 
not attained due the failure of the application of force to achieve the military objective. A 
political failure occurs when the political objectiye of a military operation is not attained 
even though the application of force successfully achieves the military objective. 
Based on the preceding definilions, a military operation has three possible outcomes' 
a military failure (the military obje(;tiYe is not attained). a politi(;al failure (thc military 
objective is attained, the political objective is not attained), and a political success (both the 
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military and political objectives are attained). These possible uutcumes can he represented 
in a Venn diagram as shown in Figure 25. 
Figure 25. Venn Diagram ofthe Outcomes ofa Military 
Operation 
Since the sum of the probability of each outcome equals 1, the following equation can he 
deduced from the Venn diagram: 
P(Milirary Failure) • p(Milirary Succ~.!S II Political Failure) • P(Political Success) • 1 (63) 
Since we have already defint:d a political failure as occurring when the military objective is 
attained but the pulitieal objective is not, this equation can then be simplified as: 
P(Milirary Failur~) • P(Political Failure) • P(Politicul Success) • 1 (64) 
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The expected uti lity of a military operation is the sum uflhe product oflhe probahility of 
each possible outcome and the utility assigned to that outcome. Thus, 
(66) 
We know from the Venn diagram thar 
P~5 · 1 - P "0'- - P~F (67) 
Substituting for Pp, in Ihl;.': expected utility equation yields: 
Conceptually, the difference between the uti lity of a military failure and the uti lity of a 
polit ical success can be referred to as the cost of a military failure, or CMF " Likewise, the 
difference bctWCl;.':ll the utility of a political failure and the utility ofa political success can 
be referred to as the cost of a political failure, or Cw Substituting these terms into the 
expected utility equation now yields: 
(70) 
The difference beTWeen the expected utility of a military operation and the utility of a 
political success can be referred to as the expected cost of a military operation. TIlerefore, 
suhtracting U,s from each side yields: 
Expected Cost . P _( __ • PNC~F (71) 
Notc that one should only pursue a military operation whcn the operation' s expected cost is 
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less than the utility of political success. Otherwise, one should maintain the staus quo and 
receive the reference utility of zero. 
In this thesis, risk is defined as the product of "cost" and "probabil ity." The expected 
cost ofa military operation, therefore, is the aggregate risk ufamilitary operation. Ifwe let R, 
represcnt the aggregate risk, R),{F represent the risk of mili tary failure, and R~F represent the 
risk of political failure, the above equation can be rewritten a<;· 
(72) 
Thus, risk in milirnry cperations, as defined in this thesis, is additive. 
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